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ABSTRACT 
 The thesis seeks to establish the following: 
 The nexus between the origins of the state and the universality of Human Rights, 
 That abuse of Human Rights is a threat to international peace and security and 
 It is an obligation for the international community under the auspices of the 
United Nations (UN) to intervene in the ‘internal affairs’ of a state which violates 
Human Rights.  
The paper focuses on the paramountcy of Human Rights and argues that the doctrine 
of state sovereignty and cultural relativism undercut the essence and universality of 
Human Rights. The paper puts into perspective the interpretation of the United Nations 
Charter, cultural relativism and Human Rights. Necessarily the essay analyzes the 
historical and legal obligations of a state. The thesis asserts that abuse of Human Rights is 
a threat to international peace and security and the international community is legally 
obligated to enforce the observance of Human Rights.  
 
INDEX WORDS: Universal Human Rights and the United Nation’s Right to Intervene, 
Threat to International Peace and Security, School of Law, Godfrey Mhlanga, LL.M, The 
University of Georgia.  
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Chapter 1 
Introduction  
This thesis asserts that:  
 Human Rights are universal, 
 States are obligated to observe Human Rights, 
 The abuse of Human Rights is a threat to international peace and security 
and  
 The United Nations Charter empowers the international community to 
enforce the observance of Human Rights.  
Human Rights violations negate the principles of self-determination and state 
sovereignty. A state that violates Human Rights forfeits its power to internalize Human 
Rights issues.
1
 In cases where states violate Universal Human Rights state sovereignty, as 
envisaged by U.N art. 2, para.1, becomes irrelevant. Therefore, the international 
community has a right to intervene.
2
 International Human Rights law precedes state 
sovereignty. To assert universality of Human Rights this paper briefly discusses the state 
and analyses ‘cultural relativism’ vis-à-vis Human Rights. It argues that the state is 
                                                 
1
 See, Albrecht Schnabel, International Efforts to Protect Human Rights in Transition Societies: Right, 
Duty, or Politics, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND SOCIETIES IN TRANSISION: CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES, RESPONSES, 
141, 154, (Shale Horowitz and Albrecht Schnabel, eds., 2004). “Recent debates focus on the fact that many 
states are abusing and neglecting their authority and responsibility and thus should be deprived of their own 
privileges, including that of full sovereignty.”   
2
 Schnabel, International Efforts to Protect Human Rights in Transition Societies: Right, Duty, or Politics, 
in HUMAN RIGHTS AND SOCIETIES IN TRANSISION: CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES, RESPONSES, supra note 1 at 
141, 154,  “As Hugo Grotius already argued in the seventeenth century, ‘where [tyrants] provoke their own 
people to despair and resistance by unheard of cruelties, having themselves abandoned all the laws of 
nature, they lose the rights of independent sovereigns, and can no longer claim the privilege of the laws of 
nations.’” 
 2 
inherently obligated to protect its citizens and this protection includes the observance and 
promotion of Human Rights.  
The primacy of Human Rights over state sovereignty puts the provisions of the 
United Nations Charter (the Charter) into perspective. Human Rights violations are a 
threat to international peace and security as envisaged by Article 1 (1) of the UN 
Charter.
3
 Therefore, the United Nations is obligated to universally preserve and enforce 
the observance of Human Rights among its member and non-member states.
4
 Any other 
interpretation to the Charter provisions will render the United Nations irrelevant.
5
  
Despite the ongoing debate about the origins of Human Rights this thesis is 
predicated on the fact that Human Rights are an inalienable reality.
6
  The concept of 
Universal Human Rights theorized in this paper amounts to “some conception of a human 
or…a person as being with needs and interests that must be met if he or she is to live a 
                                                 
3
John P. Humprey, The International Law of Human Rights in the Middle Twentieth Century, in 
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS, PROBLEMS OF LAW, POLICY AND PRACTICE, (Richard Lillich et al. eds. 
2006)  “[I]t should be said that Article One [of the UN Charter] puts the promotion of respect for human 
rights on the same level as the maintenance of international peace.” See also, Nina Graeger, Human rights 
and Multi-functional Peace Operations, in UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS? 175, 182 (Robert G. Patman ed.. 
Macmillan Press Ltd. Great Britain, St Martins Press, Inc. United States of America 2000),. “Human rights 
violations is not only a consequence but also a cause of insecurity and instability, and of complex 
emergencies…If not stopped systematic human rights violations can easily develop into armed conflict. 
Taking action against human rights violations may also de-escalate a conflict that has broken out.” 
4
 See, Louis Henkin, THE RIGHTS OF MAN TODAY, 94 (1978). “Despite resistance, it was established that 
UN preoccupation with human rights was not intervention in matters that are essentially within the 
domestic jurisdiction of a state, in part because UN consideration was not intervention, even more because 
human rights were not a domestic, but an international, concern.” 
5
 See, below, the discussion on Human Rights and the United Nations.  
6
 See, Louis Henkin, THE AGE OF RIGHTS, 31 (1990). “The individual had human rights before the 
international system took notice of them and would continue to have them if the international law of human 
rights were repealed and the international system turned its back on them.”  See also Fernando R. Teson, 
International Human Rights and Cultural Relativism, in HUMAN RIGHTS, The International Library of 
Essays in Law and Legal Theory, 117, 133, (Philip Alston, ed,, 1996). “Despite serious problems of 
enforcement, the dynamism of human rights groups throughout the world and the pressure exerted on 
delinquent governments by democratic nations has achieved remarkable results, demonstrating that the 
belief in human rights is not a mere illusion created by scholars, but an effective and living tool for political 
reform.”  
 3 
fully human life.”7 Therefore, Human Rights are universally inalienable. At the 1993 
Vienna Conference Boutros Boutros-Ghali, the former UN Secretary-General, explained 
that “human rights…are not the lowest common denominator among all nations but 
rather what I should describe as the ‘irreducible human element,’ in other words, the 
quintessential values through which we affirm together that we are a single human 
community.”8 Throughout the thesis, I consciously capitalize Universal Human Rights to 
emphasize their fundamentality. Universal Human Rights, Human Rights and Rights are 
used interchangeably unless stated otherwise. It should also be noted that I use the term 
humanitarian intervention to encompass intervention on the grounds of Human Rights 
law. It is not necessarily confined to international humanitarian law or the law of war.  
This paper is divided into three chapters which cover this introduction, the 
background on Universal Human Rights, Cultural Relativism, the Primacy of Universal 
Human Rights, State Sovereignty, the United Nation and Human Rights, the Commission 
on Human Rights, the two Covenants and the conclusion.   
                                                 
7
 JACK MAHONEY, THECHALLENGE OF HUMAN RIGHTS ORIGINS, DEVELOPMENTS AND SIGNIFICANCE, 81, 
(2007). Mahoney quoted Stirk. 
8
 See  id. at 56.  
 4 
     
 
Chapter 2 
The Universality of Human Rights 
Background 
Universal Human Rights defy precise definition. They are an expansive collection 
of rights. Human Rights include, but are not limited to civil, political, economic, social, 
cultural and religious rights. In 1995 the United Nations Commission of Global 
Governance identified a non-exhaustive list of values which fall within the rubric of 
Universal Human Rights. It identified the following universal rights: 
1. Right to life, 
2.  Right to liberty,  
3. Right to justice and equity,  
4. Right to mutual respect, caring and integrity.9  
Civil liberties and political rights are generally universal.
10
 Richard Lillich et al, wrote, 
“the concept of human rights embraces a certain universe of values having to do with 
human dignity.”11 Even though Universal Human Rights are generally categorized as 
first, second or third generation there are times when classification is done so as to deny 
                                                 
9
  Id. at 166.  
10
 Rex Honey, Human Rights and Foreign Policy in UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS? supra note 3, at 226, 227. 
He noted that “Certainly, much of the world has accepted the justice of first-generation rights, those 
guaranteeing civil and political rights.”  
11
 Richard Lillich et al, The Concept of Human Rights, in INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS, PROBLEMS OF 
LAW, POLICY AND PRACTICE, supra note 3 at 2.   
 5 
“the status of ‘rights’ to one or more of them, rather than to expand international 
domestic protections.”12  
Universal Human Rights are interdependent.
13
 A stable state observes and 
promotes Human Rights and it progresses politically, economically, socially and 
culturally.
14
 The 1968 International Conference on Human Rights which was held in 
Teheran established that “since human rights and fundamental freedoms are indivisible, 
the full realization of civil and political rights without the enjoyment of economic, social 
and cultural rights is impossible.”15 Violation of political rights negatively impacts the 
economic, social or cultural rights of any given people and vice versa.  
To support the universality of Human Rights, Richard Lillich, discussed the 
American Declaration of independence, the French revolution, the Navajo culture and the 
Code of Hammurabi.
16
 Common among these disparate peoples is the equality of man 
and treatment of everyone with dignity and respect. Africans, Asians and Latin 
Americans share a common Human Rights culture in their struggle for self-
determination. They all attained their self-determination and independence through the 
                                                 
12
 AUTOMOMY, SOVEREIGNTY, AND SELF DETERMINATION. THE ACCOMODATION OF CONFLICTING RIGHTS 
(Revised by Hurst Hunnun) 108 (1996). As such this paper sparingly categorizes Human Rights. 
13
 See, U.N. General Assembly Resolution A/RES/32/130. The General Assembly is “Profoundly 
Convinced that all human rights and fundamental freedoms are interrelated and indivisible.” 
14
 See, Albrecht Schnabel and Shale Horowitz, Protecting Human Rights in Transition Societies: Lessons 
and Recommendations, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND SOCIETIES IN TRANSISION: CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES, 
RESPONSES, supra note 1, at 415, 420. “Human rights violations have strong negative effects on a society’s 
capacity to manage conflict, to develop economically, and to democratize, whereas protecting and 
promoting human rights has the opposite effect.” 
15
 See MAHONEY, supra note 7, at 55. Quotation is an excerpt from The United Nations and Human Rights 
1945-1995 (1995) intro. by Boutros-Ghali, Secretary-General of the United Nations, New York: 
Department of Public Information, United Nations.  1968 was declared the International Year of Human 
Rights. 
16
 Lillich, The Concept of Human Rights, in INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS, PROBLEMS OF  LAW, POLICY 
AND PRACTICE, supra note 3, at 2-3  
 6 
banner of Universal Human Rights.
17
 Cultural relativism was neither an issue nor a 
justification for denying them their Human Rights.
18
  
Recorded history is awash with abuses of Human Rights. Killings, mistreatment, 
discrimination, injury of another and any or all human inflicted suffering are 
paradigmatic of the ‘evolution’ of humans. 19  Nonetheless, it is fair to assert that through 
all this dark history, Human Rights and human civility has steadily, albeit painstakingly, 
improved.
20
 International law establishes the foundation of state to state international 
relations.
21
 In so doing international law fosters common Human Rights values that states 
                                                 
17
 W. Ofuatey-Kodjoe, The United Nations and human rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND SOCIETIES IN TRANSISION, 
supra note 1, 103 at 103. “[T]he revolutions and ideologies on the basis of which they [transitional societies] gained 
their independence and statehood were framed in terms of the human rights of their inhabitants…” For example in 
South Africa’s transition from apartheid to pro-democracy was because Human Rights were an integral part 
of the campaign for self-determination.   
18
 See, Nina Graeger, Human rights and Multi-functional Peace Operations in UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS? 
supra note 3, at 175, 179. “Human rights are by definition universal, whereas the framework of protecting 
them is based on particular values, represented in the nation-state. What may be defined as an issue of 
international concern is becoming an increasingly important question…[C]ollective political authority can 
become a necessity rather than an infringement.” 
19
 See, Lillich, The Concept of Human Rights, in INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS, PROBLEMS OF LAW, 
POLICY AND PRACTICE, supra note 3, at 3.  “Abuses of human rights have abounded over time and space”. 
For example, just in the last century, the Turks in 1915 abused and slaughtered the Armenians. From 1934 
to 1945 Hitler and his Nazi bandwagon violated and killed the Jews and the gypsies. From 1929 to 1933 
Stalin had a reign of terror in Russia (USSR).  In 1975 to 1979 Pol Pot and Khmer Rouge abused and 
murdered millions in Cambodia, in the 1994 Rwandese  genocides and from 1992-99 the Yugoslavian 
genocides. Human Rights abuses in Darfur are swept under the rug of state sovereignty. The list goes on 
and on. 
20
 See, Louis Henkin, THE AGE OF RIGHTS, supra note 6, at 28. “International concern with human rights 
has required redefinition of what lies within each state’s domestic jurisdiction and what is of international 
concern.” The Divine Right of Kings used to justify the monarchs absolute power over their domain. They 
ruled by decree. Any individual rights were an internal. Only the king could grant them. The British led the 
universal enforcement of abolition of slave trade in the Atlantic Ocean. Abolition of slave trade led to a 
gradual abolition of slavery and piecemeal observance of Human Rights. The end of WWII led to the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The Universal Declaration established universal standard of 
Human Rights thereby making inroads to state sovereignty. The international community started taking 
action in situations which were historically considered to be internal state affairs. For example, the United 
Nations imposed sanctions on Southern Rhodesia and on apartheid South Africa because of their abuse of 
Human Rights. It also intervened militarily in Somalia, Haiti and belatedly and Rwanda on humanitarian 
grounds. Thus, despite some setbacks the Human Rights regime continues to evolve.   
21
 See Excerpt by Henkin, Why States Observe International Law in LORI F. DAMROSCH et al, 
INTERNATIOANAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS, 30, (4
th
 ed., 2001). “Like such domestic law, international 
law too has authority recognized by all. No nation considers international law as “voluntary”.  
 7 
should follow.
22
 Arguments and counter arguments about the contextual applicability of 
Human Rights may be proffered but it is disingenuous and unconvincing to argue that 
these counter-arguments negate the universality of Human Rights.  Universalism of 
Human Rights is entrenched in the human makeup of mankind.
23
 William Shakespeare 
dramatized the notion of universal Human Rights when Shylock poised questions 
illustrating the equality of Jews to the rest of human kind.
24
  
Prior to the formation of the United Nations state sovereignty was elevated to the 
level of sacrosanctity and the international community did not concern itself with Human 
Rights violations.
25
 In the process ordinary people suffered.
 26
 However, since the end of 
WWII, the drumbeat of Universal Human Rights has been louder. Hence, “[a]s a blanket 
objections to international concern with human rights, the claims of domestic jurisdiction 
                                                 
22
 See, Philip Alston, The Sources of Human Rights Law: Custom, Jus Cogens, and General Principles, in 
HUMAN RIGHTS, The International Library of Essays in Law and Legal Theory supra note 6 at 3, 28. 
“International law has grown to encompass the protection of human person spontaneously rather that out of 
a habit; in the development of human rights law principles have always preceded practice.” See also, below 
discussion on Human Rights and Cultural Relativism. 
23
 See, Maria Michela Marzano, Universalim and Cultural Specificity: Female Circumcision, Intrinsic 
Dignity and Human Rights in HUMAN RIGHTS AND M ILLITARY INTERVENTION 50, 54 (Alexander Moseley 
and Richard Norman eds., 2002) “[U]niversal human rights commonly imply that there is a single human 
nature common to all people and that human nature may serve as the basis for a political theory which 
dictates what is right or wrong.” 
24
 See MERCHANT OF VENICE, 89, Scene 3:1 (David Bevington and David Scott Kastan, eds.,). Shylock 
asked, ‘Hath not a Jew eyes? Hath not a Jew hands, organs, dimensions, senses, affections, passions? Fed 
with the same food, hurt with the same means, subject to the same diseases, healed by the same means, 
warmed by and cooled by the same winter and summer, as Christian is? If you prick us, do we not bleed? If 
you tickle us, do we not laugh? If you poison us, do we not die? And if you wrong us, shall we not 
revenge? If we are like you in the rest, we will resemble you in that.’ 
25
 See, Louis Henkin, THE RIGHTS OF MAN TODAY, 94 (1978). “The UN Charter…ushered in new 
international law of human rights. The new law buried the old dogma that the individual is not “subject” of 
international politics and law and that a government’s behavior toward its own nationals is a matter of 
domestic, not international, concern.” 
26
 For example, WWII did not spread because of Hitler’s heinous Human Rights record (undoubtedly one 
of the darkest moments in history). Hitler’s cardinal sin was his invasion of Poland, a sovereign state, and 
not the brutalization of German citizens, particularly Jews. The final solution may have been implemented 
after 1942 but the persecution of Jews started in 1933. WWII broke out in 1939. Thus, violation of the 
rights of the Jewish people went on for six years before the outbreak of WWII and it continued throughout 
the duration of the war.  
 8 
and nonintervention have been long dead.”27 The international community explicitly or 
implicitly acknowledges the universality of Human Rights.  “[E]ven those who 
‘officially’ reject the whole idea of human rights will, when convenient, quite happily 
rely on it for rhetorical purposes.”28  
Michael Freeman identified two realist arguments which contend that 
universalism is futile because realism counters universalism and that universalism is 
dangerous because it leaves states vulnerable to ruthless aggression due to interstate 
competition.
29
 This argument ignores historical facts. History has seen more and more 
international cooperation rather than aggressive intestate competition. There was a time 
when state interests legitimized aggression and expansionism.
30
 Although state interests 
may still be the driving force behind states’ policies its practical impact has been greatly 
curtailed by international co-operation. The guiding principle now is the maintenance of 
“international peace and security”.31 The international community tries hard, maybe not 
hard enough, to stop any state from pursuing state interest which threaten international 
                                                 
27
 Louis Henkin, THE AGE OF RIGHTS, supra note 6, at 53. 
28
 Gideon Calder, Grounding Human Rights: What Difference Does it Make?, in  HUMAN RIGHTS AND 
MILLITARY INTERVENTION, supra note 23 at 15, 15. Such rhetoric is very common among leaders of former 
colonized states. The so called “founding fathers” of formerly colonized states rode on the back of Human 
Rights to justify their fight for self-determination, but as soon as they got into power they suppress(ed) the 
very people they purportedly fought to liberate. They dismiss intervention by the international community 
on the pretext of  state sovereignty.    
29
 Michael Freeman, Universalism, Particularism and Cosmopolitan, in INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE, 65, 65 
(Tony Coates, ed., 2000).   
30
 Examples range from the Spanish conquest of the Yucatan to Conquests of North and South America and 
the British and French empires in Asia and Africa. 
31
 See UN Charter art., 1. It reads in relevant part: 
 The purpose of the United Nations are: 
1. To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective 
measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace and for the suppression of acts of 
aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in 
conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of 
international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace 
 9 
peace and security. The creation of the League of Nations
32
 and subsequently the United 
Nations supports this notion.
33
  
The universality of Human Rights can be deduced from the fact that Human 
Rights discourse is widespread. As a result, “not only have diplomatic exchanges 
between states come to incorporate human rights considerations…even among those 
states which have not explicitly adopted a rights-based foreign policy but also popular 
thought about international relations has characteristically adopted the language of 
universal human rights.”34 Accordingly, “words have consequences, and the rhetoric 
people and states employ shapes the world they construct together.”35 Even the worst 
human rights violators try to hide their Human Rights abuses from international 
scrutiny.
36
 “No doubt the commitment of many countries to human right is less than  
                                                 
32
 The preamble to the Covenant of the League of Nations proposes international co-operation.  
33
 Chapter I of the UN Charter spells out the purposes and principles of the organization. Among the 
purposes is the maintenance of international peace by taking collective measures as a prevention and 
removal of threats to peace. See Article 1 (1). 
34
 Chris Brown, Universal Human Rights? An Analysis of ‘Human Rights Culture and its Critics, in 
UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS? supra note 3, at 31, 31-32.  
35
 See Chris Brown, Universal Human Rights? An Analysis of ‘Human Rights Culture and its Critics, in 
UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS? supra note 3, at 31, 32 
36
 See, Louis Henkin, THE AGE OF RIGHTS, supra note 6, at 29.  “There is some deterrent influence in the 
very idea of rights, in fact of making a commitment in a constitution or in an international instrument, in 
continuing participation in human rights discussions. The existence of commitments and institutions 
renders violations illegitimate, requiring concealment or false denials. It provides basis for protest both 
within countries and from outside, by international organizations, nongovernmental organizations, the 
press, and individuals whose voices are heard.” For example Burma, Zimbabwe, North Korea, Iran to name 
a few; have very strict media laws that forbid journalists from broadcasting their anti Human Rights 
policies and practices. If the governments of these states were genuinely convinced that Human Rights are 
not universal they would not mind having their policies and practices reported or published. Zimbabwe has 
the Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act which requires journalist to be licensed by the 
government and the Public Order and Security Act which makes it an offence to publish anything that is 
“likely to cause alarm or despondency”. One can guess the reasons behind the enactment of these statutes 
given the recent developments in Zimbabwe where political persecution and denial of all civil rights is the 
norm. As recent as October 2007, the Burmese government managed to block internet publication of the 
demonstrations led by monks demanding better governance. Almost all media outlets in these states are 
controlled by the government.  
 10 
authentic and whole-hearted. Yet…even hypocrisy may sometimes deserve one cheer for 
it confirms the value of the idea, and limits the scope and blatancy of violations.”37 
The Primacy of Human Rights 
Primacy in the context of Universal Human Rights is not limited to the durational 
precedence of Human Rights but extends to the important or principal role Universal 
Human Rights play in national and international relations. The 1993 Vienna Declaration 
and Programme of Action of the World Conference on Human Rights declared the 
primacy of Universal Human Rights.
38
  
The modern day concept of Human Rights may have evolved from the abolition 
of slave trade and slavery
39
, but Human Rights discourse predates the abolition 
movement.
 40
 In 1806 President Thomas Jefferson, in his message to Congress, explicitly 
used the language of human rights and urged the lawmakers “to withdraw the citizens of 
the United States from all further participation in those violation of human right.”41 In the 
same year, across the Atlantic, the British parliament confronted the problem of slave 
                                                 
37
 MAHONEY, supra note 7, at ix.   
38
 A/CONF.157/23, 12 July 1993. Paragraph 5 reads, “All human rights are universal, indivisible, and 
interdependent and interrelated. The international community must treat human rights globally in a fair and 
equal manner, on the same footing, and regional particularities and various historical, cultural and religious 
backgrounds must be borne in mind, it is the duty of States, regardless of their political, economic and 
cultural systems, to promote and protect all human rights and fundamental freedoms.” See also  Vivit 
Muntarbhorn, Asia and Human Rights at the Crossroads of New Millennium: Between the Universalist and 
the Particularist? in UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS ?, supra note 3, at 81, 84. “The final text adopted by the 
World Conference itself advocated the universality of human rights and the primacy of international 
standards over national and regional practices or particularities.” 
39
 Lillich, et al,  The Concept of Human Rights, in INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS, PROBLEMS OF LAW, 
POLICY AND PRACTICE supra note 3, 3 “The process by which the concept of human rights is harnessed to 
generate legal obligation and change is illustrated by the attack and eventual official demise of slavery.” 
See also, MAHONEY, supra note 7, at 171. “[A]bolition of slavery is probably the most telling example of 
cultures being painfully challenged by the emergence of new ethical insights”, 
40
 See Rein Mullerson, Fifty Years of the United Nations: Peace and Human Rights in the UN Agenda in 
HUMAN RIGHTS FOR THE 21
st
 CENTURY  at 143, 143  (Robert Blackburn and James J. Busuttil eds., 1997). 
Mullerson argues that historically it is the religious persecutions that brought human rights on the 
international agenda. 
41
 PAUL GORDON LAUREN, THE EVOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS, VISION, SEEN, 39 (1998).  
 
 11 
trade so as to defend “justice in the name of ‘common rights of humanity”.42 Actually, 
“[t]he historical evolution of visions of international human rights that continues to this 
day started centuries ago…It began as soon as men and women abandoned nomadic 
existence and settled in organized societies, long before anyone had ever heard of the 
more recent expression “human rights,” or before nation-states negotiated specific 
international treaties.”43    
Notwithstanding the above, Human Rights are primary because they are 
“regarded as the sum total of values without which the human personality cannot be 
conceived.”44 The sudden surge of Human Rights law, Human Rights treaties and Human 
Rights conferences after WWII resulted from the realization that Human Rights 
violations pose a threat to international peace and security.
45
 More than sixty years after 
WWII, international peace and security is still threatened because states which violate 
Universal Human Rights have mushroomed and they are scattered all over the world
46
 
and mostly it is the weak states which are the worst perpetrators of Human Rights 
abuse.
47
 These states occasionally implode and in the process threaten international peace 
                                                 
42
 Id. at 39. 
43
 Id. at 5.  
44
 Zoran Pajic, Crimes Against Humanity: A Problem of International Responsibilty, in HUMAN RIGHTS 
FOR THE 21
st
 CENTURY, supra note 52, at 133, 135. 
45
 Rein Mullerson, Fifty Years of the United Nations: Peace and Human Rights in the UN Agenda in 
HUMAN RIGHTS FOR THE 21
st
 CENTURY, supra note 40, at 143, 144. “The most important motivation for the 
post Second World  War rapid development of international human rights law was the link, real or 
perceived, between massive human rights violations and threats to international peace and security” 
46
 In Asia we have North Korea, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Laos, Belarus and Burma. In the Middle East 
Saudi Arabia, Syria, Pakistan and Iran. In Africa Zimbabwe, Equatorial Guinea, Egypt, Cameron, Libya, 
Swaziland, Eritrea and Sudan top the list. In the Americas Cuba, and lately Venezuela are Human Rights 
abusing states. In the Russian province of Chechnya Human Rights abuses are prevalent. Even though 
some of these states are not militarily weak the potential for an implosion due to Human Rights abuses 
cannot be overlooked.   
47
 Rein Mullerson, Fifty Years of the United Nations: Peace and Human Rights in the UN Agenda in 
HUMAN RIGHTS FOR THE 21
st
 CENTURY, supra note 40, at 143, 144 
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and stability. The threat posed by multiple weak states is more dangerous
48
 and difficult 
to contain. For example, when the Soviet Union with its Human Rights abusive record 
collapsed the Balkans, which was the former Soviet sphere of influence, was engulfed in 
wars. The historic Balkan Human Rights abuses were brought to the surface.
49
     
The primacy of Human Rights withstands the criticisms that have been leveled 
against their universality. According to Jack Mahoney there is a school of thought that 
argues that the promotion of Human Rights will lead to proliferation or more demand for 
Human Rights and therefore debases the essence of Universal Human Rights.
50
 This fear 
is unwarranted. In 1986, the General Assembly passed Resolution 41/120 on Setting 
International Standard in the Field of Human Rights. Briefly, this resolution sets the 
parameter of Universal Human Rights in that it, “[i]nvites Member States and United 
Nations bodies to bear in mind the following guidelines in developing international 
instruments in the field of human rights; such instruments should, inter alia: 
(a) Be consistent with the existing body of international human rights law; 
(b) Be of fundamental character and derive from the inherent dignity and worth 
of the human person; 
(c) Be sufficiently precise to give rise to identifiable and practical 
implementation machinery, including reporting systems 
(d) Provide, where appropriate, realistic and effective implementation machinery, 
including reporting systems; 
(e) Attract broad international support;
51
 
These guidelines are a starting point. Therefore, any Human Rights demand that falls 
outside these guidelines may not be recognized. Even though there may be an increase in 
                                                 
48
 W. Ofuatey-Kodjoe, The United Nations and Human Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND SOCIETIES IN 
TRANSISION, supra note 1, at 103,103.   
49
 The long standing ethnic and religious tensions among the Serbs, the Croats, the Albanians and the 
Bosniacs spilled over into political, economic and cultural structure of the former Yugoslavia. Human 
Rights violations received muted criticism from the League of Nations. After WWII the occupying forces 
in the Balkans installed their own puppets. For example the Soviet Union supported Josip Broz Tito and his 
successors who suppressed ethnic Albanians in Yugoslavia. It culminated in the Balkan wars of the 1990s.   
50
 MAHONEY, supra  note 7, 71 
51
 See A/RES/41/120 
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the demand for individual rights the increased demand will not debase the currency of 
Human Rights if the above guidelines are followed. In any case “if assertions of rights 
represent the leading edge of moral insight, then proliferation is inevitable.”52 The 
resolution emphasizes the primacy of the Universal Declaration, the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social, and Cultural Rights.  
Another misplaced argument is that Human Rights are “individualistic and as 
expressive of a concern for self which disregards one’s duties to others and interests of 
the wider community”.53 This argument does not hold because “promotion and protection 
of individual rights is a public good.”54 Every right has an accompanying obligation. For 
example, a right to life obliges the possessor of that right to respect the life of another. 
Outside the legally recognized defenses, possessor of a right to life may not kill. Right to 
liberty, justice, mutual respect and caring also carry with them respective obligations not 
to offend the same guaranteed rights of another. This symbiotic relationship among 
individuals makes Human Rights not ‘individualistic’ but societal.     
Other “opponents…of human rights justify their opposition by maintaining that 
rights theory and language are actually unnecessary…since moral claims which they 
purport to make can be expressed in other moral terms and can be established at least as 
validly in other ways.”55 Human Rights are a cluster of rights which can be distinguished 
                                                 
52
  Mahoney supra note 7, at 95. Mahoney quotes Habgood. 
53
 Id , at 71 
54
 Louis Henkin, Introduction, in THE INTERNATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS, THE COVENANT ON CIVIL AND 
POLITICAL RIGHTS, 1, 13 (Louis Henkin ed,. 1981). “International human rights imply rights for individual 
against society, but they are not seen as against the interests of society. Rather, it is believed, a good society 
is one in which individual rights flourish…Any apparent conflict between the individual and society, 
between individual rights and a more general public good, is only temporary and superficial; in the longer, 
deeper view the society is better if the individual’s rights are respected.” 
55
 See MAHONEY, supra  note 7, at 72  
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from other rights that are derived from other moral consciousness. Even though Human 
Rights are arguably morally based, they have attained an enforceable legal status of 
international customary law.
56
  
Mahoney, identifies some scholars who dismiss Human Rights as social terrorism 
or fictitious.
57
 This criticism does not pass muster because Human rights are neither non-
existent nor are they social terrorism. It is widely accepted that the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights “states a common understanding of the peoples of the world concerning 
the inalienable and inviolable rights of all members of the human family and constitutes 
an obligation for the members of the international community.”58 As such Human Rights 
cannot be non-existent and in an effort to defeat and thwart terrorism the international 
community passed resolutions which link terrorism to abuse of Human Rights.
59
 It is the 
lack of Human Rights that leads to social terrorism and not vice versa.      
Human Rights and Cultural Relativism 
Does cultural relativism denote different Human Rights entitlements and demands 
to different people? The unqualified answer is an emphatic NO, because “[e]ach person, 
even if she/he is part of a specific community and therefore also a ‘product, of this 
community’s particular culture, is in fact worthy of respect as a human being.”60 Robert 
                                                 
56
 Michael W. Reisman, Sovereignty and human rights in contemporary international law, in DEMOCRATIC 
GOVERNANCE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, 239, at 240 ( Gregory H. Fox and Brad R. Roth, eds., 2000). 
57
  MAHONEY, supra  note 7, at 71. 
58
 Proclamation of Teheran, Final Act of the International Conference on Human Rights, Teheran, 22 April 
to 13 May 1968, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 32/41 at 3 (1968). See also, the discsussion below on the United 
Nations and Human Rights. 
59
 See, A/RES/49/60 and A/RES/56/160. Observance of international standards of Human Rights is 
considered to be part of eliminating terrorism.  
60
 Maria Michela Marzano, Universalim and Cultural Specificity: Female Circumcision, Intrinsic Dignity 
and Human Rights in HUMAN RIGHTS AND MILLITARY INTERVENTION, supra note 23, at 50, 53. See also, 
Fernando R. Teson, International Human Rights and Cultural Relativism, in HUMAN RIGHTS, The 
International Library of Essays in Law and Legal Theory, supra note 6, at 117, 139. “The place of birth and 
cultural environment of an individual are not related to his moral worth or to his entitlement to human 
rights. An individual cannot be held responsible for being born in one society rather than in another, for one 
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Patman, points out that one cannot “blackbox” cultures because culture is both “complex 
and multi-faceted.” 61    
Given the diverse socio-economic cultures of the peoples of the world, it is 
unsurprising that there are differences in the interpretation or application of Human 
Rights. However, with these assumed differences there are some fundamental Human 
Rights similarities. Unfortunately, the differences are sometimes hyped and exaggerated. 
In the process the differences overshadow the similarities. The cultural context in which 
Human Rights are applied may be relevant but one must guard against an exaggerated 
and fatalistic approach of cultural relativism to Universal Human Rights.
62
 There is no 
culture that can justifiably deny its own citizens the right to life, right to justice and 
equity, right to liberty or right not to be subjected to arbitrary arrest or imprisonment.
63
  
Violations of a citizen’s right to life, right to liberty, right not to be subjected to arbitrary 
                                                                                                                                                 
‘deserves neither one’s cultural environment nor one’s place of birth.” See also, David S. Koller, THE 
MORAL IMPERATIVE: TOWARD A HUMAN RIGHTS-BASED LAW OF WAR, 46 Harv. Int’l L.J. 231, at 244. 
“[T]he holders of human rights are individuals, not other actors such as states or corporations. Since human 
rights are enjoyed simply on the basis that individuals are human beings, these rights are enjoyed equally 
by all humans (universally) and without regard to their national legal systems (generally).” 
61
 Robert G. Patman, International Human Rights After the Cold War in UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS? 
supra note 3, at 1,15. See also Fernando R. Teson, International Human Rights and Cultural Relativism, in 
HUMAN RIGHTS, The International Library of Essays in Law and Legal Theory, supra note 6, at 117, 140. 
“By claiming that moral judgments only have meaning within particular cultures, the relativist 
underestimates the ability of the human intellect to confront, in a moral sense, new situations.”  
62
 See, Chris Brown, Universal Human Rights? An Analysis of ‘Human Rights Culture and its Critics, in 
UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS? supra note 3, at 31, 43. “Even if we are critical of the project of imposing a 
Western notion of universal human rights on peoples who have developed their own distinctive ways of 
asserting their humanity, we will almost certainly not wish to argue that any long-standing cultural practice 
is to be accepted simply because it is long-standing, since there are too many examples of long-standing 
injustices in the world for this to be acceptable.”  
63
 See, Louis Henkin, THE MAN RIGHT OF TODAY, supra note 25, at 130. “[H]ow many hungry are fed, 
how much industry is built, by massacre, torture, and detention, by unfair trials and other unjustices, by 
abuse of minorities, by denials of freedoms of conscience by suppression of political association and 
expression?” Found on page 144 Fernando R. Teson, International Human Rights and Cultural Relativism, 
in HUMAN RIGHTS, The International Library of Essays in Law and Legal Theory supra, note 6 at 117, 144.   
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arrest or imprisonment are universally wrong.
64
 If one looks at Universal Human Rights 
through the prism of fundamental political, civil economic, and social rights one would 
be hard pressed to dismiss their universality because, “[t]he right to certain basic political 
freedoms, the right to favorable economic and social conditions, the right to self-
determination and self-rule, known in current parlance, ‘first’, ‘second’, and ‘third 
generation’ rights are now widely regarded as ‘settled norms’ of contemporary 
international society, and it is rare to find outright opposition to them.”65  
In any case cultural values which are considered ‘national’ are not necessarily 
common among all its citizens of any given state. Hurst Hannun dismisses the notion of 
mono-cultural nation states and argues that states are not homogenous. They are 
composed of different societies with different and sometimes conflicting norms even 
though they may claim to have a distinct culture.
66
 Take India for example. It is a nation 
state with very diverse and sometimes conflicting cultural norms but the international 
community talks about the “Indian culture”. The same applies with Universal Human 
Rights. Despite the multiplicity of cultures Human Rights transcend cultural 
differences.
67
 Broad dismissal of Universal Human Rights on the basis of cultural 
relativism is not sustainable.
68
 One needs to address specific cultural norms that are 
                                                 
64
 Rex Honey, Human Rights and Foreign Policy in UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS? supra note 3, at 226, 226  
“[P]eople now recognize the significance of human rights as something as state (or, for that matter, other 
people) must not be allowed to violate, if no other reason than such conduct is wrong.” 
65
 Chris Brown, Universal Human Rights? An Analysis of ‘Human Rights Culture and its Critics’ in 
UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS? supra note 3, at 31, 32.  
66
 Hurst Hunnun, supra note 12, at 26. He writes, “There are a few, if any, nation-states in the world whose 
population reflects an entirely homogenous ethnic, cultural community to the exclusion of all others. It is 
perhaps no coincidence that many that might claim such status are islands…the search for homogeneity 
may, in fact, be more likely to lead to repression and human rights violations than to promote the tolerance 
and plurality which many would claim to be essential values in the twentieth century and beyond.”  
67
 See Lillich, The Concept of Human Rights, in INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS, PROBLEMS OF  LAW, 
POLICY AND PRACTICE, supra note 3, at 3.  
68
 See, Fernando R. Teson, International Human Rights and Cultural Relativism, in HUMAN RIGHTS, The 
International Library of Essays in Law and Legal Theory, supra note 6, at 117, 120-121. “[A]rguments 
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adversely impacted by Human Rights. Besides, the “very assertion of universal relativism 
is self-contradictory, not from the fact that it validates conflicting substantive moral 
judgments. If it is true that no universal moral principles exist, then the relativist engages 
in self-contradiction by stating universality of the relativist principle.”69 There is an 
undercurrent of Human Rights demands in every state that violates Human Rights 
irrespective of the given state culture.
70
   
Maria Marzano questions whether diversity counters universality or whether it is 
possible to reconcile universal rights and cultural specificity. She answers these questions 
affirmatively and gives a mundane yet very strong analogy to support her point. She 
makes a dichotomy between torture, starvation, infanticide and slavery on one hand and 
greeting customs on the other. These cannot be “treated at the same level…The question 
about cultural relativism is then where to draw the line and where not to, rather than 
whether a line is to be drawn at all.”71 Despots and undemocratic Human Rights violating 
governments distort the principles of cultural relativism
72
 and state sovereignty
73
 in an 
                                                                                                                                                 
premised upon the exclusively municipal nature of human rights law are inconsistent with present 
international law.”  
69
 Fernando R. Teson, International Human Rights and Cultural Relativism, in HUMAN RIGHTS, The 
International Library of Essays in Law and Legal Theory, supra note 6, at 117, 136. 
70
 Fernando R. Teson, International Human Rights and Cultural Relativism, in HUMAN RIGHTS, The 
International Library of Essays in Law and Legal Theory, supra note 6, at 117, 145. “[A] growing 
awareness exists in the Third World about the need for reinforcing the respect for human rights.” 
71
 Marzano, Universalim and Cultural Specificity: Female Circumcision, Intrinsic Dignity and Human 
Rights in HUMAN RIGHTS AND M ILLITARY INTERVENTION, supra note 23, at 50, 50. 
72
 See, Robert G. Patman, International Human Rights After the Cold War in UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS? 
supra note 5, at 1,15. He writes, “… the claims of cultural relativists, whether in the Middle East, Asia or 
elsewhere, may be no more than diversionary efforts by authoritarian regimes to evade fundamental 
responsibilities to their peoples and justify the continuation or repressive rule, free from outside 
interference.” See also, Chris Brown, Universal Human Rights? An Analysis of ‘Human Rights Culture and 
its Critics, in UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS? supra note 3, at 31, 35. “It is certainly convenient for the rulers 
of illiberal regimes to be able to dismiss criticisms of their rule as stimulated by alien values as will, of 
course, as being fomented by outside interests.” 
73
 See, Mohammed Bedjaoui, On the Efficacy of International Organization: Some Variations on an 
Inexhaustible Theme, in TOWARD MORE EFFECTIVE SUPERVISION BY INTERNATIONAL OGANIZATION, 
ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF G. SCHEMERS, 7, 11 ( Niels Blokker & Sam Muller(eds., 1994) Vol. I. 
“[S]overeignty is generally invoked not so much for its own sake as to protect what the state views as 
 18 
attempt to avoid international scrutiny and perpetuate their hold on power. A close study 
of different cultures shows that all cultures support the observance of Human Rights.
74
 
The obligation to promote human responsibility to others is common in Hinduism, 
Buddhism, Confucianism, Judaism, Islam, Christianity, traditional African culture and 
among philosophers from different cultures.
75
 In a nutshell the obligation is universal.
76
   
Western influence on Human Rights is evident and Human Rights language is 
“doubtless due to the dominance of the Western legal tradition in the international area, 
but the mutually agreed-upon judgment about the proscription of certain acts and the 
protection of certain values was not simply a Western moral judgment.”77 (Emphasis 
added). Unfortunately, some opponents to the universality of Human Rights describe 
them as “western imperialism.”  This is a mischaracterization of Universal Human 
                                                                                                                                                 
legitimate interests… [B]ehind the screen of sovereignty we may perceive the shadowy silhouette of 
interests which have become contradictory as between the international organization and the states which 
created it.” See also, Marti Koskenniemi, THE FUTURE OF STATEHOOD, 32 Harv. Int’l L.J. 397, at 397. “An 
international law of sovereign equality has always contained the unfortunate implication of providing 
legitimacy for the national repression of citizens, or at least impunity for tyrants.” 
74
 See MAHONEY, supra note 7, at 169.  “No one has yet improved on the answers of the UNESCO 
philosophers: Where basic human values are concerned, consulting with Confucian, Hindu, Muslim, and 
European thinkers, that a core of fundamental principles was widely shared in countries that had not yet 
adopted rights instruments and in cultures that had not embraced the language or rights. Their survey 
persuaded them that basic human rights rest on “common convictions” even though these convictions “are 
stated in terms of different philosophic principles and on the background of divergent political economic 
systems.”(Quotation from Mary Ann Glendon.) See also, DONAL O’ REARDON, Theorizing International 
Rights: Two Perspectives Considered, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND MILLITARY INTERVENTION , supra note 23, 
at 34,35. According to Reardon  “Universal claims are made on the basis of attributes that are common to 
all persons and deemed worthy of protection.” 
75
 PAUL GORDON LAUREN, THE EVOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS, VISION, SEEN, 5-8 
(1998).  
76
 Rein Mullerson, Fifty Years of the United Nations: Peace and Human Rights in the UN Agenda in 
HUMAN RIGHTS FOR THE 21
st
 CENTURY, 143, 144  (Robert Blackburn and James J. Busuttil eds., 1997).   
“Finally, international concern for human rights is legitimate…because there are common bonds between 
different peoples and there is a certain meaning in the word ‘mankind’ which induces states to take human 
rights into consideration in their foreign policy.” See also Yash Ghai, Human Rights and Governance: The 
Asia Debate, in HUMAN RIGHTS, The International Library of Essays in Law and Legal Theory, supra note 
6, 219, 232. “An authoritative statement of the position of Asian NGOs was issued on 27 March 1993 on 
the occasion of the Asian intergovernmental conference on human rights…It endorsed the view that human 
rights are universal, and are equally rooted in different cultures. While it supported cultural pluralism, it 
condemned those cultural practices which derogate from universally accepted human rights.” 
77
 MAHONEY, supra note 7, 106. Quotation is fromTwiss.  
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Rights. Human Rights influence was not confined to the West but emanated from 
different global cultures. Paul Lauren noted that,  
Early ideas about human rights…did not originate exclusively in one location 
like the West or even with any particular form of government like liberal 
democracy, but were shared throughout the ages by visionaries from many 
cultures in many lands who expressed themselves in different ways. What the 
west did provide, however, was not a monopoly of ideas on the subject but rather 
much greater opportunities for visions such as these to receive fuller 
consideration, articulation, and eventual implementation.
78
 
 
One may be tempted to argue that the above assertion is wrong because some 
cultures like Hindi and Islamic cultures do not accept the equality of men or sexes. That 
may be so, but it should be noted that despite these practices both the Hindus and the 
Moslems used the universality of Human Rights to attain their self-determination. In any 
case some of these Hindi and Islamic cultural traits are slowly dying away.
79
 For 
example, the Indian government outlawed the caste system decades ago. It legislated the 
“scheduled caste” system which is meant to assimilate the untouchables of India into the 
main stream.
80
 In the Islamic world women are slowly being emancipated from their 
historically subservient role.
81
 In fact Dr Chan, a Chinese delegate at the 1948 UN 
conference, argued that progressive Human Rights thinkers like Voltaire, Quesnay and 
                                                 
78
 PAUL GORDON LAUREN, supra note 75, at 11-12.  
79
 JACK DONNELLY, UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN THEORY AND PRACTICE, 119 (1989).  Discussing 
Cultural Relativism he writes, “...while recognizing the legitimate claims of …cultural relativism, we must 
be alert to cynical manipulations of a dying, lost or even mythical cultural past.”  
80
 Article 17 of the Indian Constitution and the Protection of Civil Rights Act 1976 outlawed the caste 
system in India. It reads: “Untouchability" is abolished and its practice in any form is forbidden. The 
enforcement of any disability arising out of "Untouchability" shall be an offence punishable in accordance 
with law. of the Indian Constitution and the Protection of Civil Rights Act 1976 outlawed the caste system 
in India. 
81
 For example: Recently, King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia pardoned a nineteen year old Saudi Arabian rape 
victim who had been sentenced to receive 200 lashes and six months in prison. The woman was gang raped 
after she and her male escort, who was not her relative, were abducted by seven men. According to strict 
Saudi Arabian Islamic law it is an offence for a woman to be in the company of a male who is not a relative 
without a male relative.. http://www.cnn.com/2007/WORLD/meast/12/17/saudi.rape/index.html. (Visited 
on December, 17 2007).  
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Diderot were influenced by Chinese Human Rights philosophers.
82
 On the other hand, the 
West has not always promoted Human Rights.
83
 Some of the most horrific Human Rights 
abuses were perpetrated by the West.
84
    
Even if we were to concede that Human Rights originated from the West they 
have a “broader application to other cultures subject to the caveat that local mores and 
claims have an essential (albeit unspecified) role in establishing them and determining 
their range of application.”85 For example, after WWII the increased regional and 
international Human Rights treaties positively influenced internal legislation of member 
states. By the 1990s all municipal policies on economic, political or cultural issues were 
“covered by some kind of international standard setting.”86  
Regional Human Rights treaties are relevant to the universality of Human Rights 
because they are common to all the regions of the world, except the Asian block.
87
 
Therefore, all state parties to regional treaties subscribe to same Human Rights values. 
Even though the Asian block is known for its lack of regional Human Rights treaties 
                                                 
82
 MAHONEY, supra note 7, 107. 
83
 See, Louis Henkin, THE RIGHTS OF MAN TODAY, supra note 25, at 129. “Respect for the individual is not 
a Western monopoly, and, moreover, it did not come naturally to the West. It had to be nurtured there; it 
has equally fertile soil elsewhere and ca be nurtured there.” 
84
 LAUREN, supra note 75, at 38 “[P]lantation owners in the West devised and practiced one of the most 
brutal and barbaric form of slavery ever known in the world, and it was widely accepted by the majority. 
85
 O’Reardon , DONAL O’ REARDON, Theorizing International Rights: Two Perspectives Considered, in 
HUMAN RIGHTS AND MILLITARY INTERVENTION , supra note 23, at 33, 41. See also, Jack Donnelly, Human 
Rights and Human Dignity: An Analytic Critique of Non-Western Conceptions of Human Rights, in 
HUMAN RIGHTS, The International Library of Essays in Law and Legal Theory, 145, 145 (Philip Alston, 
ed,, 1996). Donnelly argues that the “concept of human rights is an artifact of modern Western civilization” 
and should not be confused with human dignity. He concedes, however that “[a]lthough the idea of human 
was first articulated in the West in modern times, it would appear to be an approach particularly suited to 
contemporary social, political, and economic conditions, and thus of widespread contemporary relevance in 
the West and the Third World.” He also realizes that Human Rights and human dignity are closely 
connected and many authors treat human rights and human dignity as essentially the same.   
86
 CHRIS BROWN , Universal Human Rights? An analysis of Human Rights Culture and its Critics, in  
UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS?, supra note 3, at 31,39 
87
 See, discussion below on Human Rights and the United Nations. 
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most Asian states are parties to international Human Rights treaties.
88
 The Asian block 
issued the Asia-Pacific (Governmental) Human Rights Declaration in 1993. The 
declaration supports Human Rights in an ‘Asian context’, purportedly a context which 
proclaims the superiority of state sovereignty over Human Rights.
89
 The 1993 
Declaration reads, in part: 
[The Asia-Pacific governments] emphasise the principles of respect for national 
sovereignty and territorial integrity as well as non-interference in the internal 
affairs of States, and the non-use of human rights as an instrument of political 
pressure ….While human rights are universal in nature, they must be considered 
in the context of a dynamic and evolving process of international norm-setting, 
bearing in mind the significance of national and regional particularities and 
various historical, cultural and religious backgrounds. [Emphasis added.]   
 
The portion of the Asian-Pacific Declaration which declares “non-interference in 
the internal affairs of States” is redundant because Universal Human Rights are not an 
exclusive internal affair of any state. They are a universal responsibility of the 
international community and the international community is mandated, in fact, obligated 
to intervene and redress Human Rights issues.
90
  
Vivit Muntarbhorn, dismisses the so called ‘Asian values’ in five points: 
First, the Asian region is too vast and eclectic for a homogenous position 
classifiable as ‘Asian values’. Second the ‘Asian values’ argument has been 
instrumentalised by undemocratic regimes as a premise for self-perpetuation. 
Third many of the components advocated under the rubric of ‘Asian values’ are 
actually found in all regions rather than in Asia alone…Fourth, there is no 
evidence that broad base of the population is well represented in the decision-
                                                 
88
 For example, Cambodia, North Korea, South Korea, the Philippines, Thailand, Viet Nam etc are parties 
to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; Cambodia, China and South Korea are parties 
to the Convention Against Torture and Other Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment.  
89
 See VIVIT MUNTARBHORN, Asia and Human Rights at the Crossroads of New Millennium: Between the 
Universalist and the Particularist, in UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS?, supra note 3, at 81, 83. 
90
 Albrecht Schnabel, International Efforts to Protect Human rights in transition societies: Right, duty, or 
politics? in HUMAN RIGHTS AND SOCIETIES IN TRANSISION, supra note 1, at 141, 150. “States that cannot 
comply with…international standards must be –depending on the reasons for non-compliance –assisted, 
encouraged, or forced to fulfil their domestic responsibilities. In theory, the international community 
(preferably through the United Nations) has the legal (not only moral) duty to monitor and enforce state 
compliance with international standards.”  
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making process surrounding the claim of ‘Asian values’ expostulated by less-
than-democratic governments. Fifth, the absolute subjection of the individual to 
community of family interests is highly questionable. For instance, in not-too-
distant past, bride burning was justified by some communities as being 
acceptable. Yet, internationally and nationally, it is illegal.
91
    
 
This is a correct analysis to all the geo-political regions of the world. All regions 
are too vast to claim cultural homogeneity and all the regions share some very common 
and similar values, particularly Human Rights values. For example, the right to life is 
common among all states of every region.
92
 In keeping with the Human Rights culture 
the Asian block also accepted the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights
93
, 1986 
Declaration on Rights to Development
94
  and the 1989Convention on the Rights of the 
Child.
95
 In fact the Asian delegation was, reportedly, very happy to participate in the 
formulation of the international Declaration of Human Rights.
96
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 VIVIT MUNTARBHORN, Asia and Human Rights at the Crossroads of New Millennium: Between the 
Universalist and the Particularist, in UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS?, supra note 3, at 81, 84-85 
92
 Yoram Dinstein, The Right to Life, Physical Integrity, and Liberty, in THE INTERNATIONAL BILL OF 
RIGHTS 114, 115 (Louis Henkin ed,. 1981). Commenting on the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR), he wrote, “If the right to life is guaranteed under general international law (and it 
is submitted that such is the case), obviously the right is guaranteed vis-à-vis all states (including those 
which are not parties to the Covenant.” See also, Article 6 of the ICCPR Covenant allows capital 
punishment only if it has been legally imposed by a competent court as final judgment for a serious 
offence, not contrary to the provisions of the Covenant and the convict should be more than 18 years of 
age. The Second Protocol to the ICCPR goes further and aims at the abolition of the death penalty. No state 
party to the second protocol shall have capital punishment and no reservation is allowed.   
93
 VIVIT MUNTARBHORN, Asia and Human Rights at the Crossroads of New Millennium: Between the 
Universalist and the Particularist, in UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS?, supra note 3, at 82. See also, Article 2 
of the Universal Declaration. It  reads: “Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this 
Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other 
opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status. Furthermore, no distinction shall be made 
on the basis of the political, jurisdiction or international status of the country or territory to which a person 
belongs, whether it be independent, trust, non-self-governing or under any other limitations of 
sovereignty.” The rights listed in the Universal Declaration cannot be derogated from.   
94
 VIVIT MUNTARBHORN, Asia and Human Rights at the Crossroads of New Millennium: Between the 
Universalist and the Particularist, in UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS?, supra note 3, 82.    
95
 VIVIT MUNTARBHORN, Asia and Human Rights at the Crossroads of New Millennium: Between the 
Universalist and the Particularist, in UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS?, supra note 3, 82. See, Article 2.1 of the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child ensures that the rights listed in the convention are extended to all the 
children without discriminating them on account of their or their parent’s race, colour, sex, language, 
religion, political or other opinion, national, ethnic, or social origin, property, disability, birth or other 
status. Although acceptance of a convention does not amount to being a party to that convention it indicates 
the recognition of the rights contained in the convention. In any case quite a number of Asian states are 
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‘Asian culture’ is not inimical to Universal Human Rights. What is perceived as 
Asian Human Rights culture or lack of it is in not necessarily the ideals of the Asian 
people but the “perspective of a particular group, that of the ruling elites, which gets 
international attention.”97 The growing Asian middle class, Asian intellectuals, Asian 
minority ethnic groups and a mixture of ordinary Asians demand promotion and 
observance of their Human Rights.
98
 The need for economic growth has been used by 
some Asian states to justify their neglect of Human Rights
99
 but “human rights violations 
hamper economic development and encourage corruption and formal sector inefficiency 
(which are also causes of human rights violations).”100 Human Rights Watch came to the 
same conclusion when it assessed the economic hardships in Asia.
101
 The friendlier Asian 
states became to the dictates of Human Rights, the better their economies recovered.
102
   
                                                                                                                                                 
parties to the convention. China, Cambodia, North and South Korea, Indonesia, Laos, Philippines, 
Singapore and Thailand are parties to the convention.  
96
 See, MAHONEY, supra note 2, at 106 
97
 Yash Ghai, Human Rights and Governance: The Asia Debate, in HUMAN RIGHTS, The International 
Library of Essays in Law and Legal Theory, supra note 6, at 219, 224- 225. The official position of some 
Asian states for example Singapore, China, Malaysia and Indonesia is that “the national treatment of human 
rights is no concern of other States or the international community. Self-determination, a concept which has 
been used to advance claims of human rights, is regarded as irrelevant to independent States.”  
98
 See Yash Ghai, Human Rights and Governance: The Asia Debate, in HUMAN RIGHTS, The International 
Library of Essays in Law and Legal Theory, supra note 6, at 219, 231. 
99
 Yash Ghai, Human Rights and Governance: The Asia Debate, in HUMAN RIGHTS, The International 
Library of Essays in Law and Legal Theory, supra note 6, at 219, 227. “The economic backwardness of 
Asia has been used to establish the primacy of economic development over human rights…Therefore the 
first priority of State policy must be to promote economic development.”  
100
 Shale Horowitz and Albrecht Schnabel, Protecting Human Rights in Transition Societies: Lessons and 
Recommendations, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND SOCIETIES IN TRANSISION, supra note 1, at 415, 421.  
101
 MAHONEY, supra note 7, at 108. “On the contrary HRW [Human Rights Watch] claimed, recent 
economic and environmental setbacks in various Asian countries were exacerbated by the suppression of 
freedoms of expression and association resulting in a lack of accountability of governments to their 
people.” 
102
 Shale Horowitz and Albrecht Schnabel, Protecting Human Rights in Transition Societies: Lessons and 
Recommendations, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND SOCIETIES IN TRANSISION, supra note 1, at 415, 423. “In the 
people’s Republic of China opposition voices are suppressed…Democratization has been extremely slow, 
largely because of continued oppression of civil society. In the past 20 years, however, greater protection of 
civil and economic rights has facilitated economic development…”    
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Culture is not static.
103
 It evolves. It may evolve slowly but the unavoidable effect 
of globalization has precipitated and catalyzed this metamorphosis. Cultural relativism 
and universal Human Rights are not mutually exclusive.
104
 Every state is a member of the 
United Nations and therefore every state subscribes to Human Rights principles.
105
 Thus, 
the impact of cultural relativism on the universality of Human Rights is increasingly 
dwindling.  
                                                 
103
 Yash Ghai, Human Rights and Governance: The Asia Debate, in HUMAN RIGHTS, The International 
Library of Essays in Law and Legal Theory, supra note 6, at 219, 224. He adds that, “many accounts given 
of Asian culture are probably true of an age long ago.”  
104
 See Marzano, Universalim and Cultural Specificity: Female Circumcision, Intrinsic Dignity and Human 
Rights in HUMAN RIGHTS AND M ILLITARY INTERVENTION, supra note 23, at 50, 53. “The universality of 
human rights in not a way of denying the different and the richness of local cultures and traditions, but 
rather it is a way of protecting persons: accepting that cultural specificity does not mean accepting that 
persons participant in specific traditions cannot be autonomous decision-makers, persons endowed with 
intrinsic dignity and value.”  
105
 See infra, UN Charter art. 4 and the discussion, on Human Rights and the United Nations. 
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Chapter 3 
State Sovereignty and Human Rights 
The origins of the state and its obligations to Human Rights 
 To deal with the issue whether a state is obligated to observe the Human Rights of 
its citizens a brief history of the state is noteworthy. The state is a “comparatively recent 
phenomenon dating in the sixteenth century. No one state is identical with the next. Each 
state has its own history, experiences and culture(s).”106 Culture preceded the formation 
of the state. Before states were formed people lived in loose and diverse communities 
which had different and distinct cultures. These communities did not necessarily 
volunteer to become part of a state. Different communities were forcibly incorporated 
into single states and a state imposed a dominant culture on otherwise culturally diverse 
people. States were therefore formed to bring about efficient governance and stability 
among culturally diverse citizens.
107
  
The continued development and importance of Universal Human Rights is 
undeniably linked to the evolution of state sovereignty. There is a dichotomy between the 
monarchial and contemporary notions of state sovereignty. The modern day concept of 
state sovereignty can be traced to the 1648 treaty of Westphalia.
108
 The pre-Westphalia 
                                                 
106
 ANDREW VINCENT, THEORIES OF THE STATES, 7 (1987) 
107
 See Robert I. Rotberg, The Failure and Collapse of Nation-States, Breakdown, Prevention, and Repair, 
in WHEN STATES FAIL, 1, 3 (Robert I. Rotberg ed. 2004). “The state’s prime function is to provide the 
political good of security-prevent cross-border invasions and infiltrations, and any loss of territory; to 
eliminate domestic threats to or attacks upon the national order and social structure; to prevent crime and 
any related dangers to domestic human security; and to enable citizens to resolve their differences with the 
state and with their fellow inhabitants without recourse to arms or other forms of physical coercion.  
108
 Alexander Mosley & Richard Norman, Introduction, in, HUMAN RIGHTS AND MILLITARY 
INTERVENTION, supra note 23, at 1, 8. 
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sovereignty was defined by Jean Bodin as the “supreme power over citizens and subjects 
unrestrained by law.’ It was seen as essential to any commonwealth and by nature 
absolute, perpetual, indivisible, imprescriptible and could not be restrained lawfully.” 109 
The ‘sovereigns’ insulated themselves from any “legal scrutiny and competence [to] a 
broad category of events” 110 that were perceived to be internal. The insulation from 
outside scrutiny included Human Rights. Their authority could not be lawfully resisted. 
Therefore, the monarchial concept of state sovereignty did not guard against abuse of 
power by the sovereigns.
111
 No modern state claims absolute power over its citizens but 
some governments still violate the rights of their citizens with monarchial zeal. Human 
Rights violating states jealously guard against ‘outside interference.’112  
History, particularly the treaty of Westphalia, the French Revolution, American 
Revolution and decolonization shaped what sovereignty is today. The monarch had 
absolute power which was purportedly derived from God. This metaphysical concept of 
sovereignty was discredited when the ordinary people revolted against their monarchs in 
America, France, and Russia. Ironically, although modern day sovereignty is vested in a 
                                                 
109 VINCENT, supra, note 106 at 34. 
110
  Michael W. Reisman, Sovereignty and human rights in contemporary international law, in 
DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 56, at 239, 239-240 
111
 See LAUREN, supra note 75 at 34. He observed that “If enormous chasms thus often existed between 
vision and reality concerning human rights, the same cannot be said with reference to the doctrine of 
national sovereignty. Here theory and practice mutually reinforced each other as independent nation-states 
often behaved exactly as they wished toward those under their control and human rights simply were not 
regarded as a matter of legitimate international concern.” See also  Michael W. Reisman, Sovereignty and 
human rights in contemporary international law, in DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, 
supra note 56, at 239, 239. 
112
 Shale Horowitz and Albrecht Schnabel, Human Rights and Societies in Transition: International Context 
and Sources of Variation, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND SOCIETIES IN TRANSISION, supra note 1, 1, at 6-7. 
Horowitz and Schnabel argue that authoritarian regimes forestall challenges to their political power by 
controlling the political field and monopolizing the media. “At the same time, the regime will argue that 
local traditions and historical experiences justify its own practices and that they are threatened by the 
supposedly ‘alien’ demands of the opposition.” See also, JACK DONNELLY supra note 79, at 118 “The 
cultural basis of cultural relativism must be considered too, especially because numerous contemporary 
arguments against universal human rights standards strive for the cachet of cultural relativism but actually 
are entirely without cultural basis.” 
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state it is derived from the very people it governs.
113
 These historical watersheds 
condemned Bodin’s definition of state sovereignty to the monarchial era. Now, the state 
rather than the monarch is sovereign. The American and the French revolutions enshrined 
the phrase “We the people” in their constitutions giving the people “the theoretical and 
operational source of political authority.”114 (What Michael Reisman calls “popular 
sovereignty”115 as opposed to monarchial or absolute sovereignty). The Bolshevik 
Constitution proclaimed that all central and local power belonged to the Soviets.
116
 These 
revolutions were fundamental in that they changed the governmental and political 
landscape in very powerful states, consequently influencing international relations. 
Hence, when the United Nations was founded its purpose “to develop friendly relations 
between States [was] based on respect for the principles of equal rights and self-
determination of peoples.”117 Equal rights and self-determination of peoples are part of 
the Universal Human Rights. They apply to all states and their citizens.  
The Westphalia settlement established state sovereignty and non-intervention in 
what was perceived to be purely internal affairs of a sovereign state.
118
  Looking at it 
from a historical perspective, where territorial aggrandizement and the wars were the 
order of the day, the treaty was a positive step in trying to combat outside aggression. 
                                                 
113
 VINCENT, supra note, 106 at 35. “With the increasingly abstract quality of the State sovereignty was 
used to express more collective notions. The critics of absolute sovereignty relied on the idea of the 
supremacy of the people and their ultimate power and authority. This idea can be found in the embryo in 
the Roman law doctrine of lex regia, which argued that power was conferred by the people or populus.” 
114
 Michael W. Reisman, Sovereignty and human rights in contemporary international law, in DEMOCRATIC 
GOVERNANCE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 56, 239, at 240 
115
 Michael W. Reisman, Sovereignty and human rights in contemporary international law, in DEMOCRATIC 
GOVERNANCE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 56, 239, at 240 
116
 See Article I of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic.    
117
 Michael W. Reisman, Sovereignty and human rights in contemporary international law, in DEMOCRATIC 
GOVERNANCE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 56, 239, at 240 
118
 LAUREN, supra note 75, at 27. “The treaty of Westphalia signed in 1648 provided recognition, in law as 
well as in fact, of the power and authority of sovereign, independent states to be the only legitimate actors 
in a decentralized international system.”   
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Even though it encouraged the rights of states it did not enhance the rights of individuals. 
However, state obligation in the post 1945 period differs from the Westphalia era.  Now, 
the international community concerns itself with Human Rights issues in sovereign 
states.
119
 Nevertheless, more needs to be done.
 
 
There has been an intellectual effort to define sovereignty but there is no political 
consensus to what it means.
 120
 Even though there may be disagreements to what state 
sovereignty entails it should be noted that: 
[S]overeignty is not a metaphysical concept, nor is it part of the essence of 
statehood…To the extent that sovereignty has come to imply that there is 
something inherent in the nature of states that makes it impossible for them to be 
subjected to law it is a false doctrine which the facts of international relations do 
not support.
121
  
 
State sovereignty is no longer absolute.
122
 The Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (Universal Declaration) universalized popular sovereignty.
123
 No contemporary 
philosopher, legal commentator or political leader argues or can argue that modern day 
state sovereignty gives the state absolute power over the Human Rights of its subjects.
124
  
                                                 
119
 See, A MORE SECURE WORLD: Our Shared Responsibility. Report of the High –level Panel on Threats, 
Challenges and Change, 17 (United Nations 2004) “Whatever perception may have prevailed when the 
Westphalia system first gave rise to the notion of State sovereignty, today it clearly carries with it the 
obligation of a State to protect the welfare of its own peoples and meet its obligations to the wider 
international community.”   
120
 Hunnun, supra note 12, at 14 “the content of the term ‘sovereignty’ is at best murky, whatever its 
emotional appeal.”  
121
 Id., at 14-15. Quotation from Brierly. 
122
 See Michael W. Reisman, Sovereignty and human rights in contemporary international law, in 
DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 56, 239 at 243. He asserts that even 
though sovereignty is still protected it is now people’s sovereignty rather than “sovereign of the 
sovereignty” denoting unlimited supremacy.  
123
 Article 21 (3) of Universal Declaration reads, “The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority 
of government; this will shall be expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall be by universal 
and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret vote or by equivalent free voting procedures.” 
124
 Michael W. Reisman, Sovereignty and human rights in contemporary international law, in DEMOCRATIC 
GOVERNANCE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 56, 239, at 243. “The UN Charter replicates the 
“domestic jurisdiction-international concern” dichotomy, but no serious scholar still supports the 
contention that internal human rights are “essentially within domestic jurisdiction of any State” and hence 
insulated from international law.” See also, Louis Henkin, THE AGE OF RIGHTS, supra note 6, at 27. “The 
impression that the issue of human rights is essentially domestic, not international, is patently mistaken. 
That which is the subject of international law is ipso facto not domestic.” See also ANDREW VINCENT, 
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The first hurdle against absolute state sovereignty is international law.
125
 
International law prescribes state to act consistently with the interest of other states,
126
 
international customs, and fundamental human rights norms.
127
 Hurst Hunnun states that 
some of these customs “have achieved the status of customary international law or jus 
cogens … It is clearly legitimate for international bodies to consider the human rights 
situation in any country, as human rights cannot be said to fall “essentially within the 
domestic jurisdiction” of a state within meaning of article 2 (7) of the UN Charter”128 
(Emphasis added)   
State sovereignty takes its character from the definition of the state. Article I of 
the Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States establishes that, “the state 
as person of international laws should possess the following qualifications: (a) a 
permanent population; (b) a defined territory; (c) government and (d) capacity to enter 
into relations with other states.”129 Cumulatively, these elements shape up the state’s 
obligations and rights. Robert Rotberg asserted that:  
                                                                                                                                                 
THEORIES OF THE STATES, supra, note 106 at 20, “Since the advent of international legal, political, 
economic, military and cultural organization…as well as multinational companies … it is less easy to speak 
of the dominance of a State even within its own territory.”   
125
 See, Louis Henkin, THE RIGHTS OF MAN TODAY, supra note 25, at 89. “In our time, human rights have 
become a principal activity of international governmental and non-governmental organizations and have 
led to an international law imposing human rights obligations on states.” 
126
 Kelsen, Pure Theory of Law, in INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS, supra note 21, at 20, 20. 
“[G]eneral international law is regarded as [a] set of objectively valid norms that regulate the mutual 
behavior of states. These norms are created by custom, constituted by the actual behavior of the “states.” 
127
 See Louis Henkin, Introduction, in THE INTERNATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS, THE COVENANT ON CIVIL AND 
POLITICAL RIGHTS, supra note 92 at 1, 13. “Like the eighteenth century idea of rights, international human 
rights also, inevitably, implicate the purpose for which governments are created. Rights against government 
imply limitations on government…” See also, Richard Lillich et al, The Philosophical Underpinnings of 
Human Rights, in INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS, PROBLEMS OF  LAW, POLICY AND PRACTICE, supra note 
3, at 31,31. The authors were commenting on the abolition of slave trade and slavery as a Human Right. 
“[H]uman right was asserted well before it became proscribed by treaties, international custom, or 
generally accepted international legal principles.”  
128
 Hunnun, supra note 12, at 20. He gives examples of diplomatic immunities and alien injuries as part of 
limitations to the reach of state sovereignty. 
129
 Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, December 26, 1933.  
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Nation-states exist to provide a decentralized method of delivering political 
(public) goods to persons living within designated parameters (borders). Having 
inherited, assume, or perhaps replaced the monarchs of yore, modern states focus 
and answer the concerns and demands of citizenries…There is a hierarchy of 
political goods. None is as critical as the supply of security, especially human 
security.
130
 [Emphasis added]  
 
With this purpose in mind it must be noted that it is the ‘demands of citizenries’ (i.e. 
“popular sovereignty”) and the fulfillments of these demands which map up ‘human 
security’. Among these demands, if not all, are Human Rights. Defined territory denotes 
the right of sovereign state to control what is within its borders and that includes the 
permanent population within its territory. Commensurate with this control is the state’s 
obligation to protect its permanent population from harm. 131  If a state violates the 
Human Rights of its citizens it fails to provide the required “human security” therefore, 
its sovereignty can be challenged on that basis.
132
 Generally, state sovereignty entails that 
other states should not intervene in the internal affairs of self-governing state. 
Unfortunately, threat to international peace usually arises as a result of the international 
community’s non-interference in a sovereign state’s Human Rights issues.133 Fortunately, 
                                                 
130
 Robert I. Rotberg, The Failure and Collapse of Nation-States, Breakdown, Prevention, and Repair, in 
WHEN STATES FAIL, supra note 107, at 1, 2. 
131
 Robert I. Rotberg, The Failure and Collapse of Nation-States, Breakdown, Prevention, and Repair, in 
WHEN STATES FAIL, supra note 107, at 1, 3. “The state’s prime function is to provide the political good 
of security-prevent cross-border invasions and infiltration, and loss of territory; to eliminate domestic 
threats to or attacks upon the national order and social structure; to prevent crime and any related dangers 
to domestic human security”  
132
 See, Genevieve Souillac, From Global Norms to Local Change: Theoretical Perspective on the 
Promotion of Human Rights in Societies in Transition, in, HUMAN RIGHTS AND SOCIETIES IN TRANSITION, 
CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES, RESPONSES, supra note 1, at 77, 80. “Recent notions of human security based on 
the human right to life and integrity of the body may even override the principle of state sovereignty.” See 
also, Robert I. Rotberg, The Failure and Collapse of Nation-States, Breakdown, Prevention, and Repair, in 
WHEN STATES FAIL, supra note 107, at 1, 9. “Once the state’s capacity … to perform in expected manner 
recedes, and once what little capacity remains is devoted almost exclusively to the fortunes of a few or to a 
favored ethnicity or community, then there is every reason to expect less and less loyalty to the state on the 
part of the excluded and disenfranchised.” 
133
 For example, despite Human Rights abuses and sporadic mass killings in Rwanda and Burundi which 
date back to 1962 the international community failed to intervene in this region. Human Rights violations 
destabilized Central Africa region. Refugees from both Burundi and Rwanda populated neighboring 
countries. The killings culminated into the 1993-1994 genocides in both countries. To date peace and 
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“the principle of non-intervention, a core principle of a state’s national sovereignty (and 
security), seems to have become conditional on state’s ability to create an environment 
that protects minimum human rights standards promoted by international law.”134 
State sovereignty encompasses self-determination and decolonization is part of 
the process to attain self-determination. The international community was heavily 
involved in this process.
135
 Unfortunately, self-determination from external domination in 
almost all former colonized states did not always lead to internal self-determination. 
Internal self-determination “requires internal democracy and respect for the human rights 
of all peoples”136 but proclaimed leaders of the newly independent states almost always 
perpetuate[d] and even worsen violation of Human Rights.
137
 People, who are denied 
Human Rights, cannot be considered to have attained self-determination.
138
 A permanent 
population which is abused by its own government is entitled to change its 
                                                                                                                                                 
security within this region is threatened because the international community failed to intervene in time. 
The same can be said about the former Yugoslavia where ethnic Human Rights abuses have been a historic 
threat to international peace and security.    
134
 Albrecht Schnabel, International Efforts to Protect Human Rights in Transition Societies: Rights, Duty, 
or Politics, in, HUMAN RIGHTS AND SOCIETIES IN TRANSITION, CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES, RESPONSES, supra 
note 1, at 141, 155. 
135
 Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations established a ‘Mandate’ system which was meant to 
prepare colonized people for self governance. This laid the ground for UN trusteeships and in 1960 the 
United Nations General Assembly passed Resolution 1514 (XV), The Declaration on the Granting of 
Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. The declaration proclaimed that the process of liberation 
is irreversible and that there is a need to speedily end colonialism.      
136
 Fernando R. Teson, International Human Rights and Cultural Relativism, in HUMAN RIGHTS, The 
International Library of Essays in Law and Legal Theory, supra note 6, at 117, 128. 
137
 Africa serves as a great example of this unfortunate but very common phenomenon among decolonized 
states. The latest example is Zimbabwe where Robert Mugabe is perpetrating the post independence 
African legacy of oppressing his own people.     
138
 See Jamie Munn, Intervention and Collective Justice in the Post Westphalia System in HUMAN RIGHTS 
AND MILITARY, INTERVENTION supra, note 23, at 185, 195 He quotes Walzer: ‘when violation of human 
rights within a set of boundaries is so terrible that it makes talk of community or self-determination…seem 
cynical and irrelevant, that is, in cases of enslavement or massacre.” (Later he adds mass expulsion to the 
list of grievous abuses that may justify humanitarian intervention.) This paper supports and subscribes to 
the notion of international intervention but argues that the abuse of Human Rights does not have to 
degenerate to a ‘terrible’ state of affairs for the international community to be involved. Mere evidence of 
systematic Human Rights violation should be a benchmark for international community’s right to 
intervene. Basing the international community’s right to intervene only when the abuse of Human Rights 
has reached a ‘terrible’ stage negates the very essence of Human Rights which is to protect people from 
being abused.     
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government.
139
 Empirical evidence has shown that, without international intervention, it 
is very difficult and sometimes impossible for a systematically abused people to change 
their abusive governments on their own and establish a functional non- human rights 
abusive government.
140
 Jamie Munn argues that the “[p]ost-Westphalia rationality 
implies that the state has lost its historical usefulness, and certain new solution to 
problems of security must increasingly be found in the form of multinational collective 
decision-making and action…We are firmly moving from the security of the sovereign 
state to the security of humanity.”141 
Another twist to state sovereignty arises from the legacy of colonialism.
142
 The 
colonial era irrevocably disrupted the socio-political and economic structures of 
indigenous peoples. At independence former colonized people inherited defined 
territories, which had their own permanent populations. They formed their own 
governments which had the ‘capacity’ to engage in formal relations. However, colonies 
were made of people who often had very different ethnic, cultural and/or religious 
                                                 
139
 See Gerard Chaliand, Historical Precedents in REVOLUTION & POLITICAL CHANGE IN THE THIRD 
WORLD, (Barry M. Shutz and Robert O. Slater eds.) 19, 20. Assessing the essence of a government he 
asserted that, “The idea that a people or nation has “natural rights” and that the nation legitimizes the state 
was first formulated as a proposition of universal validity at the end of the eighteenth century. This 
revolutionary idea implied that if the citizens…of a state no longer approve of the political organization of 
their society, they have the right to replace it with a better system. It was the assimilation of this concept 
that made it possible to achieve national liberation, recover a sense of identity, and begin nation building.” 
140
  Afghanistan (under the Taliban), Burma (Myanmar), Cuba, Iraq, North Korea Zimbabwe, are a few 
examples. Citizens of these countries could not or cannot get rid of abusive governments without 
international intervention. It took the United States and its allies to get rid of the Taliban in Afghanistan. 
The junta in Burma has been in power since 1988. The citizens of Burmese have failed to change the 
oppressive government on their own. Fidel Castro has been the president of Cuba since 1959. Despite 
American sanctions and unofficial American attempts to topple him he has survived his presidency. Iraqi 
dictator Saddam Hussein survived all internal attempts to change his government since he got into power 
1979. He was only toppled from power in 2003 with American, British and a number of few other 
countries’ assistance. North Korea’s famiy dictatorship of Kim II Sung and Kim Jong-il has been ruled the 
country since independence in 1948.   
141
 Jamie Munn, Intervention and Collective Justice in the Post Westphalia System in HUMAN RIGHTS AND 
MILITARY,  INTERVENTION supra, note 23, at 185, 205.  
142
 See, Louis Henkin, THE AGE OF RIGHTS, supra note 6, at 29. “Colonialism was once a “domestic 
affair”; now colonialism (at least in its traditional form) is in effect illegal and self determination is the first 
article in both international human rights covenants.” 
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beliefs. These culturally diverse people were bundled together for the economic or 
political convenience of the colonial masters. (The partitioning of Africa, did not consider 
the inherent ethnic differences of colonized people
143
). Most Human Rights violations are 
ethnicity based.
144
 Almost always the ethnic majority or minority in power oppresses 
those of different ethnic persuasion.
145
 The colonial legacy makes these Human Rights 
violations a problem of international proportion and not just an internal issue for a 
sovereign state. 
Somalia is a good example why Human Rights are not an exclusive matter of a 
sovereign state. Before colonialism and the partition of Africa, Somalia had a functional 
political system of nomadic societies which was based on families.
146
 These social groups 
had a code of conduct which prevented internecine wars and promoted security and social 
justice among themselves.
147
 The scramble for Africa partitioned Somalia among the 
British, the Italians and the French. The colonialists established their own euro-centric 
capitalist structure. They imposed a colonial system whereby “all Somali social 
institutions and practices were either completely destroyed or weakened and subjugated 
                                                 
143
 See Chaliand, Historical Precedents, in REVOLUITION & POLITICAL CHANGE IN THE THIRD WORLD, 
supra note 139, at 19, 23 He notes “…serious problems existed with the concept of the nation-state. First, 
the state frontiers marked out by the colonizer, especially in Africa, had marginal historical bases and 
coincided only accidentally with more or less homogenous ethnic groups. In Afro-Asiatic world, the 
creation of nation-states has almost universally led to minorities being discriminated against or oppressed.” 
144
 Examples range from Burundi, Rwanda, Somalia and Sudan. Abuse of Human Rights in these states 
emanates from ethnic differences.  
145
 See Gerard Chaliand, Historical Precedents, in REVOLUTION AND POLITICAL CHANGE IN THE THIRD 
WORLD, supra note 139, at 19, 23. “In the Afro-Asiatic world, the creation of nation-states has almost 
universally led to minorities being discriminated against or oppressed.”  
146
 See Wafula F. Okumu, Human rights in transition societies: The cases of Somalia and South Africa, in 
HUMAN RIGHTS AND SOCIETIES IN TRANSISION, supra note 1, at 291,297-298 (Shale Horowitz and 
Albrecht Schnabel, eds., 2004). 
147
 Wafula F. Okumu, Human rights in transition societies: The cases of Somalia and South Africa, in 
HUMAN RIGHTS AND SOCIETIES IN TRANSISION, supra note 1, at 291, 297-298 
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to serve the colonial interests.”148 The disruption of Somali nomadic led to the Somalis 
competing for the same limited resources which led to internecine wars and resistance to 
colonial power. “The situation was exacerbated by the failure of the colonial states to 
govern effectively and justly. Instead of protecting and promoting human rights, the 
British, French, and Italians established administrations that made their violations a 
modus operandi. To make matters worse, the departing colonialists handed over power to 
their preferred leadership, that of Aden Abdullah Osman Daar.”149 The United States and 
the Soviet Union also played their part in destroying Somalia. They supplied Siad Barre, 
a Human Rights abusing kleptomaniac, with weapons in return for access to Somalia’s 
strategic port.
150
 To date Somalia is a dysfunctional state, bedeviled by internecine wars 
and abuse of Human Rights, a legacy which can fairly be attributed to colonialism and 
the Cold War.             
It is impossible to rewind history. These former colonized multi-ethnic or multi-
cultural nation states exist and the international community has to deal with them and 
their problems. Alleging that Human Rights abuse by those in power is an exclusive 
internal or sovereign matter is dangerously naive given that “violation of minority rights 
continues to constitute the most serious threat to international security because of their 
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  Wafula F. Okumu, Human rights in transition societies: The cases of Somalia and South Africa, in 
HUMAN RIGHTS AND SOCIETIES IN TRANSISION, supra note 1, at 291, 298 
149
 Wafula F. Okumu, Human rights in transition societies: The cases of Somalia and South Africa, in 
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possible effect on such crucial issues as statehood and stability of the international 
system.”151  
The dynamics of global economy is a silent but very potent challenge to the 
doctrine of exclusive state sovereignty.
 152
 No state can survive or optimally utilize its 
economic potential without international trade.
153
 International trade has made significant 
inroads to state sovereignty and, “with the realization that the global rather than the 
national economy exercises the greater influence on economic well-being, the state loses 
its significance as a center of authority through which people can express their 
preferences and claim their right.”154 Even though its stated purpose is strictly 
international trade, the World Trade Organization (WTO) cannot avoid the Human Rights 
demands of trade. For example, paragraph 3 of the Declaration on the Trade-Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) Agreement on Public Health recognizes 
the importance of protecting intellectual property rights but for the benefit of public 
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 MAHONEY, supra note 7, at 165. Quoting Evans.  
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health, paragraph 4 encourages flexibility in the interpretation and implementation of the 
TRIPS agreement.
155
  
Encouragingly, there is a growing number of authorities who have suggested that 
the doctrine of state sovereignty must be revisited so that states become more accountable 
to their citizens. Proponents of such rethinking include the former secretary of OAU 
Salim Ahmed Salim; former Nigerian president, General Olusegun Obasanjo; and former 
Secretary of the Commonwealth, Sir Shridath Kampal.
156 
Former OAU secretary, Salim 
Ahmed Salim asserted that rethinking of a less inhibitive doctrine of sovereignty will 
foster accountability of governments both nationally and internationally.
157
 The former 
president of Nigeria Olesugun Obasanjo advocated minimum standard of decent behavior 
which can only be realized by a transparent principle of sovereignty.
158
 Sir Shridath 
Kampal proposed that developing nations should actually be at the forefront of 
advocating the rethinking of state sovereignty.
159
 He argued that transparent state 
sovereignty will benefit the developing nations more because every state’s policy will be 
open to the international community’s scrutiny.  
All sources of international law i.e. international customary law, international 
agreements and general principles of law common to major legal systems of the world are 
the starting point for Universal Human Rights.
 160
 The Universal Declaration, which is the 
foundation of modern day Human Rights regime, is declaratory of customary 
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international law.
161
 “Customary human rights law has bound states that have been 
unwilling to accept treaties or that have done so with the inclusion of debilitating 
reservations.”162 Therefore, the states’ obligation to observe Human Rights is controlled 
by customary law which emanates from Universal Declaration. Thus, Human Rights 
obligations from treaties supplement and not supplant the states’ customary Human 
Rights obligations.  
Human Rights and the United Nations Charter 
With the passage of time Human Rights have established their station on the 
international scene. They are an invaluable asset to the maintenance of international 
peace and security.
163
 Domestic and international stability, or for that matter instability 
depends on the promotion and observance of Human Rights.
164
 Unlike wars or a nuclear 
conflict, violation of Human Rights poses a threat which is “not easily countered, or 
conquered by direct action…Human Rights violations, especially gross and systematic 
ones are erga omnes violations of international law which are not committed against a 
specific foreign state.”165 A synopsis on collective security defined, “Any event or 
process that leads to large-scale death or lessening of life chances and undermines states 
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as basic unit of the international system” as a threat to international security.166 
[Emphasis added] Violation of Human Rights is a process that undermines an offending 
state “as a basic unit of the international community” and such violations lessen the life 
chances of the victimized citizens and sometimes lead to large-scale death. This notion 
shows the indispensability of Universal Human Rights to the maintenance of 
international peace and security. The importance of Human Rights to international peace 
and security is also supported by the following historical developments:  
i) The founding and subsequent growth of the United Nations. 
ii) The adoption of the Universal Declaration and the subsequent adoption of 
the two Covenants (the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights) and 
iii) The proliferation of regional Human Rights Treaties.  
An unbiased interpretation of the UN Charter dictates that Human Rights are 
critical to the United Nations’ purpose of maintaining international peace and security.167 
Although the preamble, to any given charter or treaty, may not form part of the 
provisions of the charter or treaty it is an invaluable aide in ascertaining the intent of the 
framers of any given instrument. The preamble to the U.N. Charter identifies the main 
objectives of the United Nations.
168
 It inextricably resonates with the provisions of the 
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article 1 and article 55
169
 of the Charter. UN Charter art. 1, para. 1. is self explanatory. It 
reads that United Nations was formed ‘to maintain international peace and security, and 
to that end: take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats 
to the peace.’ [Emphasis added] However, at formation of the United Nations threat to 
international peace and security was defined in the light of foreign invasion.
170
 The lack 
of international interest in Human Rights before 1945 was due to the geo-political and 
socio-economic conditions prevailing then.
171
 All the powerful and most influential states 
were opposed to ‘elevating’ Human Rights issues to an international level. They violated 
Human Rights. Russia, with its gulags, considered Human Rights to be within the 
exclusive jurisdiction of a sovereign state, the United Kingdom also regarded the very 
inhumane treatment of the natives of its empire to be its sole prerogative, France like the 
                                                                                                                                                 
[T]o save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought 
untold sorrow to mankind, and  
[T]o reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of human person, in the 
equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small, and [emphasis added] 
[To] establish conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties 
and other sources of international law can be maintained and  
[To] promote social and better standards of life in larger freedom. 
169
 U.N Charter art. 55 para. c. reads:  
With a view to the creation of conditions of stability and well-being which are necessary for 
peaceful and friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and 
self-determination of peoples, the United Nations shall promote:  
(c) universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all 
without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion. [Emphasis added] 
170
 Mohammed Bedjaoui, On the Efficacy of International Organization: Some Variations on an 
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 Threat of foreign invasion was a more pressing matter than abuse of Human Rights. Considering the 
violent historical past this was not an unfounded position to take. Abuse of Human Rights was hardly on 
the agenda of international discourse. During this era Human Rights abuses were commonplace.  
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UK did not want its hegemony over its colonies to be interrupted by Human Rights 
concerns
172
 and the United States had laws which segregated against its own citizens. 
The creation of the United Nations led to serious attention and/or attempt to 
observe and implement Human Rights.
173
 But just like every new development the 
Human Rights culture has spent “its life stretched on the rack between certainty and 
adaptability, sometimes groaning audibly but mostly maintaining the stoical appearance 
of steady uniformity which public confidence demands.”174 Although politics ended up 
dominating the formation of the United Nations the original intent was to make Human 
Rights a top priority of the international community.  This is evidenced by the initial 
intent to adopt a Universal Bill of Rights as a legal document.
175
 Unfortunately, the 
intended adoption of the Universal Bill of Rights was derailed by mistrust and 
disagreements (particularly between the United States and the Soviet Union). 
Nonetheless, the United Nations ended up adopting part of the Bill of Rights, i.e. the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948.
176
 In terms of Articles 10, 11, 13 and 14 
of the Charter the General Assembly may make recommendations on issues about 
international co-operation and on matters that threaten international peace. Although, 
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General Assembly resolutions are “basically recommendatory,”177 they “may be 
considered by governments and by courts or arbitral tribunals as evidence of international 
custom or as expressing (and evidencing) a general principle of law.”178 The International 
Court of Justice weighed in and said: 
The Court notes that General Assembly resolutions, even if they are not binding, may 
sometimes have normative value. They can, in certain circumstances, provide evidence 
important for establishing the existence of a rule or emergence of an opinion juris. To 
establish whether this is true of a given General Assembly resolution, it is necessary to 
look at its content and the conditions of its adoption; it is also necessary to see whether an 
opinion juris exists as to its normative character. Or a series of resolutions may show the 
gradual evolution of the opinion juris required for the establishment of a new rule.
179
 
The General Assembly is a universal body made up of all the states and that enhances the 
legitimacy of its resolutions. Even though General Assembly’s resolutions are in theory 
non-binding, “certain resolutions, or declarations of the U.N. General Assembly may 
have a law-making function.”180 Of particular relevance is the Universal Declaration 
which was unanimously adopted and is “now accepted as declaratory of customary 
international law.”181  
The 1948 adoption of the Universal Declaration is extremely important because 
the Universal Declaration “is a document that expresses a shared minimum consensus of 
human rights law.”182 It grandfathered the universality of Human Rights.183 As a result, 
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the provisions of the Universal Declaration are constantly evoked and relied upon “in 
various political and legal contexts-including those involving states with different social, 
economic, and philosophical backgrounds”,184 thus setting “into motion its gradual 
transformation into a source of customary international law.”185 The United Nations 
Conference on Human Rights held in Teheran in 1968 proclaimed that “[t]he Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights states a common understanding of the peoples of the world 
concerning the inalienable and inviolable rights of all members of the human family and 
constitutes an obligation for the members of the international community.”186 The 
Conference affirmed the principles of the Universal Declaration and urged the 
international community to abide by these principles.
187
 All the 84 states unanimously 
voted that “the Universal Declaration of Human Rights…constitutes an obligation for the 
members of the international community.”188 In 1970 the General Assembly passed one 
of its most celebrated declaration, the Declaration on Principles of International Law 
Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States in Accordance with the 
                                                                                                                                                 
Commenting on the Universal Declaration he wrote, “Its declared significance and almost unanimous 
approval were not the only indications of the widespread recognition and influence the Declaration was 
destined to exert…For one thing, it has become a standard of reference and a practical guide for UN organs 
whenever human rights issues face them.” 
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 Therefore, the International Conference on Human Rights, 
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Charter of the United Nations (The Friendly Relations Declaration), which inter alia 
declared, that “every State has the duty to promote through joint and separate action 
universal respect for and observance of Human Rights and fundamental freedoms in 
accordance with the Charter.”189 In keeping with the general trend the Conference on 
Security and Co-operation in Europe
190
 (The Helsinki Final Act of 1975) incorporated the 
purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter and the Universal Declaration.
191
 
Even though these last two instruments forbid intervention it should be noted that: 
in its traditional unwritten conception, in the principles of the United Nations Declaration 
on Friendly Relations, or in the principles adopted at Helsinki (which derive from the 
Declaration on Friendly Relations), the obligation not to intervene applies only to matters 
within a state’s domestic jurisdiction. By virtue of the UN Charter and its aftermath, of 
particular conventions, or of Helsinki itself, human rights are not a matter of domestic 
jurisdiction and concern with them cannot be intervention or other impermissible 
interference.
192
[Emphasis added.] 
Besides, the Declaration on Friendly Relations encourages people who are denied the 
right of self determination to seek and receive support from the international community 
to enforce their rights
193
 and Article VII of the Helsinki Final Act stipulates that “the 
participating States recognize the universal significance of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms, respect for which is an essential factor for the peace, justice and well- being 
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necessary to ensure the development of friendly relations and co-operation among 
themselves as among all States.” [Emphasis added.] Despite the Cold War the Helsinki 
Final Act considered Human Rights to be relevant to both the Eastern and the Western 
blocks.
194
 The United Nations World Congress on Human Rights held in Vienna in 1993 
reiterated the universality of Human Rights.
195
 The Conference recognized that Human 
Rights are a “legitimate concern of the international community.”196 
All these conferences reinvigorated the main purpose and obligation of the United 
Nations which is to maintain international peace and security.
197 
Threats to international 
peace and security are not limited to obvious military adventures.
198
  Michael Clarke 
asserts that international peace and security should not be limited to the study of 
relationships between states but should “instead, be defined as the study of those forces 
which affect the outbreak of violent conflict between any significant groups of people in 
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the world.”199 Human Rights violations are “forces which affect the outbreak of violent 
conflict” and they are now “viewed as threats to global peace, due in part to post-Cold 
War experiences with such violations resulting in domestic strife, regional instability and 
refugee crises in neighboring states.”200 If Human Rights are violated the potential for an 
outbreak of violent conflict is likely
201
 if not imminent therefore poising a threat to 
international peace and security. On the contrary if Human Rights are promoted and 
observed they greatly minimize the outbreak of violent conflicts.
202
 Taken to its logical 
conclusion, if international peace and security is to be maintained the United Nations has 
no option but to intervene in areas where Human Rights are violated. In fact “a well 
circumscribed legal right to intervene exists.”203 In its 2004 report the Secretary-
General’s High level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change noted that: 
“Collective security institutions have proved particularly poor at meeting the challenge 
posed by large-scale, gross human rights abuses and genocide. This is a normative 
challenge to the United Nations: the concept of State and international responsibility to 
protect civilians from the effects of war and human rights abuses has yet to truly 
overcome the tension between the competing claims of sovereign inviolability and the 
right to intervene. It is also an operational challenge: the challenge of stopping a 
Government from killing its own civilians requires considerable military deployment 
capacity.”204 
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The challenge is more operational than normative.
205
 Apart from the cross border threats 
that Human Rights violations pose “the willingness of the U.N. to intervene in domestic 
humanitarian crises stems from the development of international human rights law.”206 
Normatively, articles 2(4) and 2(7) of the UN Charter establish a general principle of 
collective intervention.
207
 That is any intervention must be mandated by the United 
Nations. Unfortunately, political interests results in gridlocks within the Security Council. 
Thus, operational challenges rather than normative challenges militate against the United 
Nations’ right to intervene. Humanitarian intervention is rooted in international custom. 
Since the 19
th
 century states have intervened in the affairs of other states on humanitarian 
grounds. In 1827-1830 Britain, France and Russia intervened in Greek revolt against the 
abusive Ottoman Empire; in 1860-61 France intervened in Syria to stop the massacre of 
Maronite Christians; in 1877-1878 Russia intervened and helped Romania, Serbia and 
Montenegro to claim their independence from Islamic domination by the Ottoman 
Empire and in 1903 Greece, Bulgaria and Serbia intervened to free Macedonia from the 
increasingly religious intolerant Ottoman rule.
208
 These general customary practices 
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 UN Charter articles 2(4) and 2(7) read as follows: 
The Organization and its Members, in pursuit of the Purposes stated in Article 1, shall act in 
accordance with the following Principles. 
2 (4). All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force 
against the territorial integrity or political independent of any state, or any other manner 
inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations. 
2 (7) Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in 
matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the 
Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter; but this principle shall 
note prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII.    
208
 See John Merrian, supra, note 203, at 119. 
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translated into international customary law.
209
 Articles 2(4) and 2(7) abrogate these 
customary practices in favor of collective intervention. Thus, it can be argued that the 
United Nations’ mandated right to intervene finds support from international customary 
law. Therefore, “normative challenges” are not critical to collective intervention. It is the 
United Nations operational flaws or incapacity to intervene in Human Rights crises that 
paralyzes its collective right to intervene, not the normative challenge.   
The Panel recognizes the right to intervene
210
 but distinguished the “right to 
intervene of any State” from the “responsibility to protect of every State”211 and it 
endorsed “the emerging norm that there is a collective international responsibility to 
protect.”212 The responsibility to protect, which is the same as the collective right to 
intervene, translates into a United Nations’ obligation to intervene because the UN 
Charter does “not embrace a right to unilateral humanitarian intervention.”213 This is in 
                                                 
209
 Id., at 119. “A general custom and practice of humanitarian intervention existed as early as the 19th 
century.” 
210
 See, A MORE SECURE WORLD: Our Shared Responsibility. Report of the High –level Panel on Threats, 
Challenges and Change, supra note 119, at 18. See, note 198 above. The Panel recognized the right to 
collectively intervene when it noted that “the concept of State and international responsibility to protect 
civilians from the effects of war and human rights abuses has yet to truly overcome the tension between the 
competing claims of sovereign inviolability and the right to intervene.” On page 19 of the same report the 
Panel went on to say, “[W]e have been struck once again by the glacial speed at which our institutions have 
responded to massive human right violations in Darfur, Sudan. When the institutions of collective security 
respond in an ineffective and inequitable manner, they reveal a much deeper truth about which threats 
matter. Our institutions of collective security must not just assert that a threat to one is truly a threat to all, 
but perform accordingly.” These comments indicate that there is a duty on the part of the United Nations to 
intervene but that right is frustrated by the operational mechanics of collective action.      
211
 Id., at 65. “There is a growing recognition that the issue is not the ‘right to intervene’ of any State, but 
the ‘responsibility to protect’ of every State when it comes to people suffering from avoidable 
catastrophe…” 
212
 Id, at 66. The Panel went on to identify genocide, large scale killing, ethnic cleansing or serious 
violations of international humanitarian law as grounds for military intervention. On page 83 the Panel also 
observed that “today, in an era when dozens of States are under stress or recovering from conflict, there is a 
clear obligation to assist States in developing their capacity to perform their sovereign functions effectively 
and responsibly.”  
213
 Nico Krisch, Legality, Morality, and the Dilemma of Humanitarian Intervention after Kosovo, 13 Eur. J. 
Int’l L. 323, 325. See, UN Charter article 2(4) forbids unilateral intervention or intervention without the 
United Nations mandate. See also, John J. Merriam, supra, note 203, at 115 “[A]ny military intervention in 
defense of human rights would be led by the United Nations, which has legal authority to conduct 
peacekeeping operations.” 
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keeping with the United Nations purpose to maintain international peace and security. To 
avoid any misguided or disguised humanitarian intervention and pursuant fragmentation 
of international peace and security the UN Charter prohibits unilateral intervention but 
allows United Nations mandated collective intervention.
214
 The intervention in Somalia is 
a typical example “signaling a significant advance in international acceptance of a right 
to intervene on humanitarian grounds under the auspices of the U.N., even in the absence 
of consent of the target state.”215  
Ironically, the 1993 humanitarian crises in Burundi, Rwanda and Kosovo refute 
the normative challenge argument and support the notion that the United Nations has an 
obligation to intervene. When France claimed the right to intervened in Rwanda with the 
blessings of the Security Council “many states including the U.S., maintained that there 
was no legal or moral duty to intervene, and refused to assist France…However, in 
subsequent years numerous individuals from various fields, as well as non-governmental 
organizations and international organizations, have expressed horror at the failure of the 
international community to take stronger action.”216 By implication all the individuals 
who commented on hindsight accepted that the United Nations has an obligation to 
intervene. The Independent International Commission on Kosovo concluded “that the 
NATO military intervention was illegal but legitimate. It was illegal because it did not 
receive prior approval from the United Nations Security Council.”217 Thus, the illegality 
of NATO’s intervention in Kosovo is premised on the lack of authorization from the 
                                                 
214
 See U.N Charter art. 39. See also, Nina Graeger, Human rights and Multi-functional Peace Operations, 
in UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS? supra note 3, at 175, 180. “According to Chapter VII in the UN Charter, 
international military action requires a UN mandate based on a resolution in the Security Council.” 
215
 Tania Voon, supra, note 200, at, 46. 
216
 Id., at 47. 
217
 The Independent International Commission on Kosovo, The Kosovo Report, Executive Summary-Main 
Findings, 2. 
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United Nations, implicitly conceding that the United Nations has authority at least to 
authorize intervention.  
The centrality of Human Rights is supported by U.N Charter art. 1, para. 3 which 
adds that the purpose of the UN is ‘to achieve international co-operation in solving 
international problems… and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and 
for fundamental freedoms for all.’ [Emphasis added]. U.N Charter art. 1., para. 2 provides 
for maintenance of international peace through the respect of equal rights and self 
determination.
218
 Self-determination includes internal self- determination. Any internally 
oppressed people have a right to self determination without necessarily seceding from 
their defined territory.
219
    
 
 
U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 6 obligates the United Nations to act against non-
members so as to ensure international peace and security.  The relevant part reads; “[t]he 
Organization shall ensure that states which are not Members of the United Nations act in 
accordance with these Principles so far as may be necessary for the maintenance of 
international peace an security.” U.N Charter art. 2, para. 2220 ensures that member states 
must abide with the principles of the Charter in good faith. Some of these principles are 
contained in U.N Charter art. 55 para. c
221
 and the Universal Declaration is “an 
authoritative interpretation of the obligation contained in Articles 55 and 56 of the U.N. 
                                                 
218
 The Article reads, in relevant part, “The purposes of the United Nations are: To develop friendly 
relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, 
and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace.” 
219
 See Thomas M. Franck, The Emerging Right of Democratic Governance, 86 A.J.I.L. 46 (1992). Franck 
argues that self-determination extends to a post colonial internally oppressed people without implying a 
right to secede.  
220
 U.N Charter art. 2, para. 2. reads:  
All Members, in order to ensure to all of then the rights and benefits resulting from membership, 
shall fulfill in good faith the obligations assumed by them in accordance with the present Charter.   
221
 See, note 169. 
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Charter.”222 Therefore, these provisions together with the Universal Declaration establish 
ius cogens for Human Rights law.
223
 No state should derogate from them.
224
 Article 55 
(c) explicitly ties in the observance of Human Rights and fundamental freedoms as 
“conditions of stability and well-being which are necessary for peaceful and friendly 
relations among nations.” Cumulatively read, articles; 1, 2(2), 2(6), 55 (c), and 56225 
obligate all states to maintain and observe Human Rights.
226
  
Membership to the United Nations is regulated by Chapter II of the Charter. Of 
particular interest is U.N. Charter art. 4, para. 1. The article indicates that “[m]embership 
to the UN is open to all other peaceloving states which accept the obligations contained 
in the present Charter and, in the judgment of the Organization, are able and willing to 
carry out these obligations.” Peace loving may defy a universal definition but by any 
definition a state that denies and violates the Human Rights of its citizens is by no means 
peace loving.
227
 Although the preamble to the Charter opens with the words: ‘We the 
                                                 
222
 Philip Alston, The Sources of Human Rights Law: Custom, Jus Cogens, and General Principles, in 
HUMAN RIGHTS, The International Library of Essays in Law and Legal Theory supra note 6, at 3, 21.  
223
 Dinah Shelton, Commentary and Conclusions, in Commitment and Compliance: The Role of Non-
Binding Norms in the International Legal System in, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS, PROBLEMS OF LAW, 
POLICY AND PRACTICE, supra note 3, at 137,137. “The UDHR remains, however, and many assert that its 
norms have become legally binding on all members of the United Nations as an authoritative interpretation 
of member state’s human rights obligations, or that the UDHR is binding on all states as customary 
international law through state practice and opinio juris.” 
224
 See LORI F. DAMROSCH et al, INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS, supra note 20, at 107.  
225
 U.N Charter art. 56 reads: 
All Members pledge themselves to take joint and separate action in co-operation with the 
Organization for the achievement of the purpose set forth in Article. 
 See also Louis Henkin, THE AGE OF RIGHTS, 55 (1990). “That states ‘pledge themselves’ imports legal 
obligation.” 
226
 See, James Crawford, The UN Human Rights Treaty System: A system in Crisis?, in THE FUTURE OF 
UN HUMAN RIGHTS TREATY MONITORING, 1, 1 (Phillip Alston and James Crawford, eds., 2000). “In 1945 
almost for the first time, the United Nations Charter announced the idea of human rights as real rights at the 
universal level.” See also, Louis Henkin, THE AGE OF RIGHTS, supra note 6, 56. “The generality of states 
have supported the view that ‘a consistent pattern of gross violations of human rights’ is now a violation of 
international law and obligation if practiced by any party to the UN Charter and even, perhaps, by 
nonmembers.”  
227
 See, Wafula F. Okumu, Human rights in transition societies: The cases of Somalia and South Africa, in 
HUMAN RIGHTS AND SOCIETIES IN TRANSISION, supra note 1, at 291,294. “[S]table peace in a nation-state 
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people of the United Nations,’ the people it refers to are not individuals or natural 
persons. They are states in their representative capacity. Kofi Annan, the former UN 
Secretary General, reminded “[t]he governments of the world…that they are in the 
United Nations to represent not themselves but their peoples, who expect them to work 
together for the aims set out in the Charter.”228 He summarized the aims set out in the 
Charter as, “peace, human rights, justice and development”.229 [Emphasis added]. 
Since the United Nations was founded its membership has grown.
230
 All the 193 
countries in the world are member states of the United Nations
231
 and their membership is 
conditioned on good faith fulfillment of the United Nations obligations.
232
 Logically, the 
growth of the United Nations also expanded its obligation and the obligation of its 
member states. Observance and promotion of Human Rights is one of these obligations. 
If the member states do not fulfill their obligations then the United Nations may be 
obliged to intervene. In this context the United Nations has a right to intervene because 
international obligations are “by hypothesis, of international concern and no longer 
                                                                                                                                                 
is made all the more possible by state institutions constituting a democratic government committed to 
human rights for all.”   
228
 Kofi Annan, Op-Ed., An Aspiration to a Larger Freedom, in FINANCIAL TIMES (London), March 21 
2005, at 17 
229
 Id. 
230
 See Robert I. Rotberg, The Failure and Collapse of Nation-States, Breakdown, Prevention, and Repair, 
in WHEN STATES FAIL, supra note 107, at 1, 2. According to Rotberg, in 1914, after the collapse of the 
Ottoman Empire, there were 55 recognized states. By 1919 there were 59, in 1950 they were 69 and by 
1960 there were 90 and when the Soviet Union disintegrated there were 191 states and by 2002 there were 
192 states.    
231
 The only UN recognized independent state that is not a member of the United Nations is the Vatican 
(The Holy See) but it holds a UN permanent observer status giving it some participatory opportunities in 
the affairs of the United Nations. 
232
 See U.N Charter art. 2, para. 2. See also, A. H. Robertson, The Implementation System: International 
Measures, in THE INTERNATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS, THE COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS, supra 
note 92, at 332, 332. “[I]nternational obligations are generally observed, without any special ‘enforcement 
machinery.’ The basis of international treaty relationships is good faith; it is assumed that states accept 
treaty relations in good faith with the intention of respecting their obligations, and that they will respect 
them. And, in fact, governments generally do respect them.”    
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exclusively a matter of their domestic jurisdiction.”233 As such, U.N Charter art. 2, para. 7 
which guarantee state sovereignty and non-interference in domestic matters is not 
inconsistent with the United Nations’ purpose to intervene on Human Rights grounds.234 
The United Nations can maintain peace and security by enforcing the observance of 
Human Rights.
235
 Poor or non-observance of Human Rights generally results in 
instability
236
 which usually spills over into neighboring states and threatens whole 
regions. Fortunately, Human Rights as enshrined in the Universal Declaration are 
incrementally playing a positive role in the formulation of state policies
237
 and state to 
state diplomatic relations. 
                                                 
233
 See A. H. Robertson, The Implementation System: International Measures, in THE INTERNATIONAL BILL 
OF RIGHTS, THE COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS, supra note 92, at 332, 333. Since all the states 
are members of the United Nations they impliedly accept the international Human Rights obligations 
stipulated by the Charter.  
234
 Vratislav Pechota, The Development of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, in THE 
INTERNATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS, THE COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS, supra note 92, at 31, 37 
Commenting on the work of the UN Human Rights Commission as it drafted the Bill of Rights he writes, 
“the Commission found that its mandate was well within the scope of the United Nations responsibility as 
defined in the Charter, and consequently could not be considered interference in the domestic jurisdiction 
of member states. Domestic jurisdiction…only covered questions that had not become international in one 
way or another; by agreeing that questions of human rights should form the subject of an international bill, 
states had clearly placed them outside their domestic jurisdiction and Article 2(7) of the Charter became 
inapplicable.” 
235
 Nina Graeger, Human rights and Multi-functional Peace Operations, in UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS? 
supra note 3, at 175, 182. “Many actors now accept the linkage between human rights and achievement of 
long-lasting peace and security. That is, addressing human rights is increasingly seen as a precondition for 
successful conflict resolution and conflict prevention.”  
236
 See Albrecht Schnabel, International Efforts to Protect Human Rights in Transition Societies: Right, 
Duty, or Politics, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND SOCIETIES IN TRANSISION, CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES, RESPONSES, 
supra note 1, at 141, 158. “Human rights conditions serve as useful indicators for the level of current and 
future peace and stability in a society. They also serve as a key entry point (possibly the most effective one) 
through which future instability, degeneration, and violent conflict can be averted. If human rights 
violations are detected early, and the causes of such violations are isolated and addressed, stability (even if 
fragile) can be preserved and further degeneration can be avoided.” 
237
 See Vratislav Pechota, The Development of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, in THE 
INTERNATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS, THE COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS supra 92 note 136, at 31, 
38 Commenting on the Universal Declaration he wrote, “Furthermore, caught by its impetus and perhaps 
persuaded by the overwhelming support for it that where obliged to do so, many states have enacted 
legislation or amended their laws to make them correspond with the provisions of the Declaration.” 
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The enforcement mechanism of the United Nations is set out in Chapters VI and 
VII of the Charter.
 238
  U.N Charter art. 39 gives the Security Council the mandate to 
decide what measures to take if international peace and security is threatened.
239
 The 
issue is whether violation of Human Rights by any given state falls within the provisions 
of Article 39. Rein Mullerson, noted that, “[t]hough the notion of international peace and 
security are obviously closely related and often used together and even interchangeably, 
the ordinary meaning of security is usually wider. There may be peace but not security. 
Certain acts may not threaten peace directly but they may well undermine international 
security.”240 Violations of Human Rights “undermine international security.” Therefore, 
Human Rights violations fall within the provisions of Article 39. 
Unfortunately, Human Rights have not fully recovered from the sacrificial role 
they were relegated to at the formation of the United Nations. This was further 
aggravated by the Cold which trampled Human Rights for political and economic 
expediency.
241
 What the United Nations must do to “maintain international peace and 
                                                 
238
 See, A MORE SECURE WORLD: Our Shared Responsibility. Report of the High –level Panel on Threats, 
Challenges and Change, supra note 119, at 106. “The Security Council is fully empowered under Chapter 
VII of the Charter of the United Nations to address the full range of security threats with which States are 
concerned. The task is not to find alternatives to the Security Council as a source of authority but to make 
the Council work better than it has.” This paper concentrates on the provisions of Chapter VII which, in my 
opinion, is under- utilized but perhaps the most effective enforcement mechanism. Chapter VI, pacific 
settlement of Human Rights violations rarely succeeds.    
239
 U.N Charter art. 39. reads “The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the 
peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures 
shall be taken in accordance with Article 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and 
security.” 
240
 Rein Mullerson, Fifty Years of the United Nations: Peace and Human Rights in the UN Agenda in 
HUMAN RIGHTS FOR THE 21
st
 CENTURY, supra note 76, at 143, 156 
241
 See Robert G. Patman, International Human Rights after the Cold War in U NIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS?, 
supra note 5, at 1, 3. Even though the United States decried the prevalence of Human Rights abuses in the 
Soviet block it supported Human Rights abusing leaders like the Shah of Iran, Ferdinand Marcos of the 
Philippines, Augusto Pinochet of Chile, Mobutu Seseko of Zaire, even Pol Pot of Cambodia. On their part 
the Soviets supported dictators like Saddam Hussein, Mengistu Haile Mariam, Fidel Castro and Kim II 
Sung yet they hypocritically criticized the segregation laws, at least until 1964, which the United States 
implemented against its minority black population. 
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security”,242 is broader than what was perceived in 1945.243 The United Nations 
obligation includes enforcing Human Rights which were conveniently considered to be 
within the exclusive jurisdiction of a sovereign state.  
The proliferation of regional Human Rights treaties
244
 since WWII buttresses the 
universality and the importance of Human Rights to the maintenance of international 
peace and security. Outside the so called Asian block
245
 regional Human Rights treaties 
are common in Europe, Americas, Africa, and among Arab states.
246
 Regional treaties 
                                                 
242
 See U.N Charter art. 1 para. 1. It reads; 
 The Purposes of the United Nations are: 
1. To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures 
for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of 
aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in 
conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of 
international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace. 
It must be noted that although Art.1, para. 1 touts peaceful solutions to breaches of peace it must be read in 
conjunction with the provisions of Chapter VII, particularly Article 42 which gives the Security Council the 
power to use force where other means to restore peace peacefully have failed. 
243
 Nina Graeger, Human rights and Multi-functional Peace Operations, in UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS? 
supra note 3, at 175, 180. “The world looks different on the eve of the turn of the century than it did in 
1945. The UN Charter was framed in the shadow of the Second World War, whereas today’s conflicts are 
intra-state. Besides, views on humanitarian issues have changed and the UN should take this into account.” 
See also, John Merriam, supra note 203, at 114. “The United Nations was formed to accomplish two 
principles goals: 1) to prevent the use of force as a means of settling disputes; and 2) to protect universal 
human rights.”   
244
 Regional Human Rights are not discussed in length because they are outside the scope of this thesis. 
245
 It should however be noted that there are efforts to create Asian Pacific Human Rights treaties. See, 
Lillich et al, The European System for the Protection of Human Rights, in INTERNATIONAL HUMAN 
RIGHTS, PROBLEMS OF  LAW, POLICY AND PRACTICE,supra note 3, at 617, 618.  
246
 The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (the 
European Convention) was signed in Rome in 1950 and came into effect in 1953. The American 
Convention on Human Rights (the American Convention) was signed in San Jose, Costa Rica in 1968 and 
came into effect in 1978. The African Charter on Human Rights and Peoples’ Rights (the Banjul Charter) 
was adopted by the Organization of African Unity in 1981 and came into effect in 1986. The Arab Charter 
on Human Rights (Arab Charter) was adopted by the Council of the League of Arab States in Cairo in 
1994. Party membership to these regional treaties is widespread. All members of the European Council are 
parties to the European Convention and every new member state to the European Council is expected to 
ratify the treaty. Out of thirty five members of the Organization of American States twenty four are 
members of the American Convention. All fifty three African states are parties to the Banjul Charter and all 
member states to the Arab League are parties to the Arab Charter. The statistical data is relevant because it 
gives prominence to each regional treaty and generally enhances the universality of Human Rights. All 
regional treaties promote Human Rights. See also, Fernando R. Teson, International Human Rights and 
Cultural Relativism, in HUMAN RIGHTS, The International Library of Essays in Law and Legal Theory, 
supra note 6, at 117, 122. “Unless one wishes to give up the very notion of an international law of human 
rights altogether, these rights should have essentially the same meaning regardless of local traditions.” 
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“offer a surprisingly uniform articulation of human rights law.”247 This is not surprising 
because the provisions of Regional Human Rights treaties are directly influenced by the 
Universal Declaration.
248
 For example, the European Convention on Human Rights 
affirms the Universal Declaration.
249
 The American Convention on Human Rights 
borrowed its wording from the Universal Declaration by reaffirming the democratic 
institutions within the region through the “essential rights of man…based on attributes of 
human personality.”250 Even though the African Charter on Human Rights has a caveat 
qualifying individual rights with community rights, it also heavily borrowed from the 
Universal Declaration.
251
 The Arab Charter for Human Rights is also heavily influenced 
by the UN Charter and the Universal Declaration. All the fundamental rights that are 
contained in the Universal Declaration are repeated in these regional treaties.
252
 
Therefore, a right to life, right to liberty, right to justice and equity or right to mutual 
respect, caring and integrity precede any culture.    
It can be argued that if the United Nations, with its universal membership denotes 
universalism of Human Rights regionalism fragments it. Further, regional Human Rights 
                                                 
247
 Fernando R. Teson, International Human Rights and Cultural Relativism, in HUMAN RIGHTS, The 
International Library of Essays in Law and Legal Theory, supra note 6, 117, 122. 
248
 Dinah Shelton, The Promise of Regional Human Rights Systems, in INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS, 
PROBLEMS OF  LAW, POLICY AND PRACTICE, supra note 6, at 619,619. “Virtually all the legal instruments 
creating the various regional systems refer to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and the 
Charter of the United Nations, providing a measure of uniformity in the fundamental guarantees and a 
reinforcement of the universal character of the Declaration.”  
249
 The preamble to the European Convention on Human Rights explicitly mentions that it considered the 
Universal Declaration and resolved to enforce some of the rights contained in the Universal Declaration. 
Section I of the convention mimics some of the rights that are contained in the Universal Declaration.   
250
 The preambles considers and reiterates the Universal Declaration ideals of freedom from fear and want 
which is only achievable if conditions allow man to enjoy his political, economic and social rights freely.   
251
 The Charter reaffirms and takes due regard of the Universal Declaration. Most of the provisions in 
Chapter I of the Charter are very similar to the rights contained in Universal Declaration. 
252 See, article 3 of European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
213 U.N.T.S. 221, Nov. 4, 1950; article 2 American Convention on Human Rights OEA/Ser. K/XVI/1.1, 
Nov 22, 1969: and articles 1 and 2 of the African Charter on Human and People’ Rights, OAU Doc. 
CAB/LEG/67/3/Rev. 5, June 27, 1981. 
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treaties have “clawback clauses” which subjugate Human Rights to national laws. 253 This 
apparent contradiction can be explained by fact that the UN Charter and all regional 
Human Rights treaties make the Universal Declaration their reference point.
254
 The 
General Assembly proclaimed that the Universal Declaration is the common standard of 
all peoples and nations.
255
 Regional treaties give regional context and treaty based 
legalities to the universal dictates of Human Rights.
256
 They are not a departure from the 
core values of Universal Human Rights.
257 
 
Human Rights Covenants 
The final adoption of the initially intended Universal Bill of Rights was realized 
in 1966 when the United Nations adopted the two Covenants.
 258
 The adoption of the two 
Covenants was not a coincidence. It was an unavoidable step to cement the importance of 
                                                 
253
 See, Dinah Shelton, The Promise of Regional Human Rights Systems, in INTERNATIONAL HUMAN 
RIGHTS, PROBLEMS OF  LAW, POLICY AND PRACTICE supra note 3, at 619, 619.  
254
 See, above notes 70 and 71.  
255
 All the regional treaties borrowed their Human Rights guarantees from the Universal Declaration. See, 
Section 1 of the European Convention, Chapters I and II of the American Convention, Chapter 1 of the 
Banjul Charter and Part II of the Arab Charter. The treaties commonly guarantee the following: right to 
life; prohibition of torture and slavery/force labor; right to personal liberty and fair trial; freedom of 
association, assembly, thought, conscience religion and the right to property.     
256
 See, A MORE SECURE WORLD: Our Shared Responsibility. Report of the High –level Panel on Threats, 
Challenges and Change, supra note 119, at 85. “Recent experience has demonstrated that regional 
organizations can be a vital part of the multilateral system. Their efforts need not contradict United Nations 
efforts, nor do they absolve the United Nations of its primary responsibilities for peace and security. The 
key is to organize regional action within the framework of the Charter and the purposes of the United 
Nations, and to ensure that the United Nations and any regional organization with which it works do so in a 
more integrated fashion than has up to now occurred.” 
257
 See, Louis Henkin, Introduction, in THE INTERNATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 92, at 1, 28,  “The 
Declaration and the covenants grew up while regional human rights agreements were also developing, 
insights and knowledge of each other, dealing with the same problems, in the same universe, with some of 
the same participants. Inevitably, they drew on and reacted to each other… Different agreements may have 
different texts as well as different contexts, but common phrases suggest common meanings, and practice 
under, or accepted or authoritative interpretations of the European Convention and late the American 
Convention, are not irrelevant to interpretation of the International Covenant.” 
258
 LORI F. DAMROSCH et al, INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS, supra note 20, at 602. “Whereas 
many international treaties have codified and developed pre-existing customary principles of international 
law, human rights covenants and conventions have helped to shape customary legal norms.” 
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Human Rights on the international plane.
259
 The final part of the Universal Bill of Rights 
is made of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)
260
 and the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR).
261
 These are 
the “principal international human rights agreements”262 and “together with other 
conventions adopted by the United Nations and its specialized agencies, they form a 
single body of new international law of human rights.”263  
                                                 
259
 See, Martti Koskenniemi, supra note 73, at 397-398. “The 1966  U.N. Covenants on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights and on Civil and Political Rights have affirmed that states have international 
obligations to their citizens. Along with more recent instruments on the prevention of racial and sexual 
discrimination and torture, and on the establishment of rights for children and migrant workers, these 
covenants have also instituted a universally applicable system of international inspection and supervision. 
The practical effects of such international standards may still be rather small, but their existence means that 
a state may not claim that mere statehood justifies any internal activities.” 
260
 Vratislav Pechota, The Development of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, in THE 
INTERNATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS supra note 92, at 31, 64 “The legal strength of a treat depends not only on 
the substance of the rules but also on the number of states that have consented to be bound by these rules.” 
Out of 192 states, the ICCPR has 160 state parties and the ICESCR has 157 state parties.  
261
 Initially the drafters intended to have one legal instrument which covered political and civil rights but 
the addition of economic and social rights led to two instruments. LORI F. DAMROSCH et al, INTERNATIONAL 
LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS supra note 21, at 596-597. The western powers argued that “economic and 
social rights were essentially aspirations or plans, not rights, since their realization depended on availability 
of resources and on controversial economic theory and ideology. These, they said, were not appropriate 
subjects for binding obligations and should not be allowed to dilute the legal character of provisions 
honoring political-civil rights…” 
262
 Louis Henkin, Introduction, in THE INTERNATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS, The Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights supra note 92, at 1,16. See also, Louis Henkin, THE AGE OF RIGHTS, supra note 6, at 20. 
“The international law of human rights is contained principally in the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights and International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, which together 
legislate essentially what the Universal Declaration had declared.” [Emphasis added] See also, Vratislav 
Pechota, The Development of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, in THE INTERNATIONAL BILL OF 
RIGHTS supra note 92, at 31, 35. Although he was commenting on the ICCPR it also applies to the 
ICESCR. “The covenant is not an accident of history, but a logical consequence of an integral design of the 
UN Charter to make human rights both universal and international. Time and intervening events may have 
reduced the differences between the Universal Declaration and the International Covenant insofar as their 
respective legal authority and actual impact are concerned and may have made some of the reason for a 
treaty less compelling. But they have not negated the essential purpose of the Covenant, namely, to become 
and indispensable legal means for securing worldwide respect for, and observance of, fundamental human 
rights.”  
263
 Vratislav Pechota, The Development of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, in THE 
INTERNATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS supra note 92, at 31, 43. Although Conventions e.g. the Convention 
against Torture (CAT), Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), 
Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant 
Workers and Members of their Families, etc. are equally important this paper does not discuss them in 
detail. All these Conventions and the Covenant promote Human Rights. See, Articles 2.1 and 2 of the 
ICCPR, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, Dec. 16, 1966; article 2.1and 2 of ICESCR, 993 U.N.T.S. 3, Dec 16. 1966; 
article 2.1 of Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
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Article 2(1) of the ICCPR states that “[e]ach State Party to the present Covenant 
undertakes to respect and to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its 
jurisdiction the rights recognized in the present Covenant, without distinction of any kind, 
such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social 
origin, property, birth or other status.” To that end article 2(2) obligates the state parties 
to make their internal legislation consistent with the provisions of the Convention.
264
 It is 
worth emphasizing that although states are the parties to these Covenants: 
[i]nternational human rights agreements are like other international agreements, creating 
legal obligations between the parties and international responsibility for their violation. 
They are essentially mutual undertakings among states for the benefit of third parties (the 
inhabitants of the countries party to the agreement) and in principle are enforceable by 
the promises, that is, the other parties to the agreement.
265
  
 
All Human Rights treaties provide some kind of enforcement or monitoring 
mechanism. Unfortunately, “[t]he only procedural obligation that is mandatory under all 
of the treaties is self-reporting by state parties; provisions for inter-state complaints and 
individual petition procedures are usually optional.”266 Civil and political rights are 
enforced by Article 28 of the ICCPR. Article 28 establishes the Human Rights 
Committee (the Committee)
267
 and Article 40 obligates all the state parties to submit 
                                                                                                                                                 
Punishment 1465 U.N.T.S 85, Dec. 10, 1984; article 2.1 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, 1577 
U.N.T.S. 3, Nov. 20, 1989; article 2 of the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination 
Against Women, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13, Dec. 18, 1979. So discussing the two Covenants will serve the same 
purpose and the purpose of this paper.  
264
 It reads, “Where not already provided for by existing legislative or other measures each State Party to 
the present Covenant undertakes to take the necessary steps, in accordance with its constitutional processes 
and with the provisions of the present Covenant, to adopt such legislative or other measures as may be 
necessary to give effect to the rights recognized in the present Covenant.” 
265
 LORI F. DAMROSCH et al, INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS, supra note 21, at 638 an except 
from Henkin. 
266
 Lillich, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS, PROBLEMS OF LAW, POLICY AND PRACTICE supra note 3, at 
583.   
267
 Torkel Opsahl, The Human Rights Committee, in THE UNITED NATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS: A 
CRITICAL APPRAISAL, supra note 172, at 369, 370. “Despite the Committee’s pretentious name, it would 
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reports of measures that they have adopted to give effect to the rights recognized by the 
Covenant.  The reports must be submitted within a year of the entry into force of the 
Covenant or whenever the Committee requests. Although it is a mandatory measure, the 
reporting mechanism has not been fully complied with.
268
 In its 1996 annual report the 
Human Rights Committee “expressed ‘its serious concern’ that ‘more than two thirds of 
all States parties were in arrears with their reports.”269 Despite the poor reporting record 
the reports that reach the Committee have played a significant role in the “ever growing 
[Human Rights] jurisprudence.”270 Article 41 is the most under-utilized or up to date 
never-utilized provision of the Covenant. It allows the Committee to receive from any 
state party communication of Human Rights violations by another state party and the 
right of the state parties to force another state party to comply with the Covenant and the 
reporting provision.
271
  
                                                                                                                                                 
more accurately be described as the ‘Civil and Political Rights Committee” because it only functions within 
the confines of the ICCPR and it has no jurisdiction outside its enabling Covenant. 
268
 See, Louis Henkin, THE RIGHTS OF MAN TODAY, supra note 25, at 107. “Unilateral reporting by states 
to the UN or to a special body apparently does not deter violations and improve performance, perhaps 
because the reports tend to be self-serving and evasive and have not been effectively scrutinized.” 
269
 LORI F. DAMROSCH et al, INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS, supra note 21 at, 635. See also, 
JACK DONNELLY supra note 57, 209. “The reporting procedure thus has provided a fairly widely accepted 
promotional mechanism, but it involves only information exchange and weakest monitoring. And even the 
information exchange is flawed. The reports of many countries are thorough and revealing, but others are 
farces, and some are not even submitted.”   
270
 Louis Henkin, Introduction, in THE INTERNATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS, The Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights supra note 92, at 1, 16. “Governments and especially nongovernmental organizations have 
invoked the Covenant. Disputes about compliance by particular parties are daily fare, reflecting differences 
of interpretation that cry to be discussed.” See also id., at 22 “There is a tendency to deprecate and 
depreciate it, since it is based largely on voluntary reporting, which at best tends to be self-serving and no 
likely to reveal violations…But the fact that a state has to report inevitably has some influence to induce 
better compliance.” See also, Henry Steiner, Individual Claims in a World of Massive Violations: What 
Role for the UN Human Right Committee?, in THE FUTURE OF UN HUMAN RIGHTS TREATY MONITORING, 
supra note 226, at 15, 53. “By expounding the ICCPR and spurring dialogue about it, by enriching and 
instituting more deeply the discourse of human rights, the Committee can best contribute to the massive 
work of the next fifty years.” See also Torkel Opsahl, The Human Rights Committee, in THE UNITED 
NATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL, supra note 172, at 369, 415-416. The Committee 
“deliberate matters of substance, the very contents of the Covenant, in public session. It is applying the 
Covenant, discussing interpretations, and drawing conclusions, in the manner of a quasi-legislative body.” 
271
 Given the comradeship that currently prevails among many states there are very slim chances that 
Article 41 will be used. See LORI F. DAMROSCH et al, INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS, supra 
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Optional Protocol to the ICCPR provides that the Committee can receive 
communications from individual victims of Human Rights abuse.
272
 The only 
communicants covered by this protocol are citizens of state parties to the protocol and the 
aggrieved individuals should first exhaust all the available domestic remedies before 
submitting a complaint to the Committee.
273
 An obvious weakness is that the protocol is 
optional and many states that abuse their citizens’ rights are not party to the protocol. 
Nonetheless, “[t]he one area where guarded optimism may be appropriate is the 
committee’s consideration of individual petitions under the Optional Protocol to the 
Covenant.”274 The relevance of the Optional Protocol is indicated by the growth of state 
membership to the protocol and the number of cases that the Committee has concluded. 
In 1988 there were only 87 state parties to the protocol and the Committee considered 
211 communications and concluded 72 of them on merits.
 275
 By 2004 there were 104 
state parties and out of the 1,279 communications that were submitted the Committee 
concluded 452 on merits.
276
 The optional protocol has not been optimally utilized either 
because the procedure is not widely known or because some of the state parties have 
similar but more effective regional procedures.
277
 Even though there are procedural, 
                                                                                                                                                 
note 21, 596. “Unlike the Declaration, the Covenant, since it created legal obligations addressed the need to 
provide measures for their enforcement. While in legal principle every state party is a promisee and entitled 
to request compliance by any other state party, ordinarily no other state has any interest in doing so and is 
especially reluctant to demand compliance or threaten sanctions for violation at the expense of its friendly 
relations and diplomatic capital.” Except from Henkin, The International Bill of Rights: The Universal 
Declaration and the Covenants, in, International Enforcement of Human Rights.  
272
 See, Article 1 of Optional Protocol to the ICCPR, 999 U.N.T.S. 171. 
273
 See, Id, Article 2 of the Optional Protocol.   
274
 JACK DONNELLY supra note 79, 209. 
275
 Id. at 209-210 
276
 See, Statistical Survey of Individual Complaints Dealt with by the Human Rights Committee under the 
Optional Protocol  to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. (3 May, 2004.) 
277
 See Torkel Opsahl, The Human Rights Committee, in THE UNITED NATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS: A 
CRITICAL APPRAISAL, supra note 172, 369, 422. Opsahl gives the absence of individual reports from Congo 
and Central Africa Republic as an example of lack of knowledge of the procedure and compares the 
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planning and disciplinary opportunities for improvement,
278
 the Committee has made 
some positive strides in the application of the Covenant by expressing its views “which 
contain a significant contribution to doctrine and case law.”279 Although the Committee is 
an independent organ it is linked to some United Nations organs.
280
 
Unlike the ICCPR which spells out individual rights the ICESCR targets the 
states
281
 and the obligation it imposes is somewhat less onerous than the ICCPR. 
However, that does not diminish the relevance of the ICESCR. The covenant makes “the 
United Nations ... the only place where the issues of peace, security, and development 
can be addressed together at the global level.”282 The difference between the two 
Covenants emanate from the historical dichotomy between them.
283
 Some philosophers 
                                                                                                                                                 
Optional Protocol with the more preferred and effective regional treaty of the European Convention on 
Human Rights. 
278
 Torkel Opsahl, The Human Rights Committee, in THE UNITED NATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS: A 
CRITICAL APPRAISAL, supra note 172, at 369, 436. He cites punctuality, discipline in debates and 
preparation for interventions and deliberations as some of the weaknesses.  
279
 Torkel Opsahl, The Human Rights Committee, in THE UNITED NATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS: A 
CRITICAL APPRAISAL, supra note 172, at 369, 434. 
280
 Torkel Opsahl, The Human Rights Committee, in THE UNITED NATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS: A 
CRITICAL APPRAISAL, supra note 172, at 369, 385. “[T]he General Assembly provides for member’s 
emoluments and receives annual reports, ECOSOC transmits the report and may receive the Committee’s 
general comments along with copies of State reports, and the Secretary-General provides staff and facilities 
and convenes sessions.” Arguably, this constrains the Committee’s independence but the Committee also 
benefits from the services it receives from the United Nations organs. “Inter-agency consultations on 
collaborations in implementation of the Covenant took place before the Committee began its work. Their 
experience is relevant to the Committee, and co-ordination of activities might be useful, and indeed 
necessary.” Id., at 392. 
281
 See, Louis Henkin, THE RIGHTS OF MAN TODAY, supra note 25 at 98. “The two covenants recognize the 
difference in the character of rights in various subtle ways. For example, the Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights is drafted in terms of the individual’s rights…The Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights, on the other hand, speaks only to the states, not to the individual.” 
282
 A MORE SECURE WORLD: Our Shared Responsibility. Report of the High –level Panel on Threats, 
Challenges and Change, supra note 119, at 87. 
283
 JACK DONNELLY supra note 79, at 30-31. “Initially, arguments based on natural liberty were used to free 
the process of capital accumulation from traditional restraints and to justify social and political mobility, 
but once bourgeois political power was established, arguments of natural liberty came to be used 
principally to prevent the rise, and even the protection, of lower classes...Given such a partisan 
understanding of civil and political rights, it is not surprising that the economic and social right championed 
by the left came to be seen…as essentially antagonistic…Civil and political rights did have their initial 
social basis in the bourgeoisie, and the demand for economic and social right did begin with the working 
class and socialist intellectuals. ” See, also, Philip Alston, The Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights, in THE UNITED NATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL, supra note 172, at 
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and contemporary conservatives and libertarian have argued that economic and social 
rights are not real rights.
284
 For example, Maurice Cranston argued that “traditional civil 
and political rights to life, liberty, and property are ‘universal, paramount, categorical 
moral right.’ Economic and social rights, however are neither universal, practical, nor of 
paramount importance and ‘belong to a different logical category’…that is, they are not 
truly human rights.”285 However, since civil, political, economic, social and cultural 
rights are and have been confirmed to be “interdependent and indivisible”286 the 
argument that economic and social rights are not real rights does not pass muster.
287
 The 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights noted that the ICESCR “does 
impose ‘various obligations which are of immediate effect’ contrary to the assertions of 
whose who argue that the Covenant is wholly aspirational.”288 
 Article 2 of the ICESCR requires each,  
“Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take steps, individually and 
through international assistance and co-operation, especially economic and technical, to 
the maximum of its available resources, with a view to achieving progressively the full 
realization of the rights recognized in the present Covenant by all appropriate means, 
including particularly the adoption of legislative measures.” [Emphasis added.]  
                                                                                                                                                 
473, 490. “[T]he content of the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights was not based upon any 
significant bodies of domestic jurisprudence as was the case with civil and political rights. Thus, phrases 
like ‘cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment’ had been the subject of in-depth judicial and 
academic analysis long before their inclusion in the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.” 
284
 JACK DONNELLY supra note 79, 31. 
285
 Id., at 31. 
286
 See,  id., at 28. “Today it is commonly claimed that all human rights are “interdependent and 
indivisible,” as it is regularly put in U.N. resolutions. See also, A MORE SECURE WORLD: Our Shared 
Responsibility. Report of the High –level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, supra note 119, at 86. 
“The framers of the Charter of the United Nations understood that peace and security were inseparable 
from economic development.” 
287
 JACK DONNELLY supra note 79, at, 31. “We must not dismiss or disparage civil and political rights 
because of their bourgeois heritage or partisan abuses by industrial capitalist regimes, any more than the 
murderous excesses of Stalin, allegedly in the name of economic and social rights, should cause us to reject 
those rights…In fact, one of the principal reasons for abandoning the conventional dichotomy between civil 
and political and economic and social rights is to overcome the ideological biases of both the left and the 
right with which that dichotomy was so long associated and which too often lead to politically dangerous 
arguments for the priority of one set  and the neglect or even suppression of the other.” 
288
 Philip Alston, The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, in THE UNITED NATIONS AND 
HUMAN RIGHTS: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL, supra note 172, at 473, 495. 
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The article obliges every member state to take steps to realize the rights contained in the 
covenant even though the realization is dependent on the availability of resources in a 
given state. Therefore, realization of economic, social and cultural rights may differ from 
state to state. However, this does not diminish the universality and value of these rights 
because at the end of the day the obligation is relevant to every state despite the 
differences in the availability of resources.
289
 A state party to ICESCR satisfies its Article 
2 obligation by showing that, given the resources at its disposal it has taken the maximum 
steps to have economic, social and cultural rights realized.
290
 Conversely, “a State Party 
in which any significant number of individuals is deprived of essential foodstuffs, of 
essential primary health care, of basic shelter and housing, or of the most basic forms of 
education is prima facie failing to discharge its obligations under the Covenant”.291 
Besides, “the impediments to implementing most economic and social rights…are 
political rather than physical.”292 The ICESCR gives the social, economic and cultural 
rights contained in articles 12, 16, 22-27 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights a 
readily available legal footing. 
                                                 
289
 See, Louis Henkin, THE AGE OF RIGHTS, supra note 6, at 33. Commenting on the differences between 
the ICCPR and the ICESCR he wrote, “As a matter of law, however, I do not think any of these differences 
is critical. The Convention on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights uses language of obligation, not 
merely of aspiration or hope.” 
290
 See, Louis Henkin, THE AGE OF RIGHTS, supra note 6, at 33 (1990). “An undertaking to do something 
‘to the maximum of its available resources’ and to achieve ‘progressively’ creates a clear and firm legal 
obligation, subject to those limitations.” 
291
 Philip Alston, The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, in THE UNITED NATIONS AND 
HUMAN RIGHTS: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL, supra note 172, at 473, 495. “Most importantly of all, the 
Committee observes that ‘a minimum core obligation to ensure the satisfaction of, at very least, minimum 
essential levels of each of the rights is incumbent upon every State Party.” 
292
 JACK DONNELLY supra note 79, at 32. “For example there is more than enough food in the world to feed 
everyone; widespread hunger and malnutrition exist not because of a physical shortage of food but because 
of political decisions about its distribution.” Id., at 32-33. 
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A Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (the Committee) was 
created to “assist the [ECOSOC] in fulfilling the Council’s role under the Covenant” 293 
that is “taking…measures designed to promote realization of the economic, social, and 
cultural rights of every individual living within the jurisdiction of the State concerned.”294 
The Committee should not be confused with the ICCPR Human Rights Committee. The 
ICESCR Committee was preceded by a Working Group but unlike working groups the 
Committee is not a representative of governments.
295
  Article 16 of the Covenant 
provides that each state party undertakes to submit reports of implementation to the 
Secretary-General of the United Nations and the Secretary-General in turn transmits the 
reports to the Committee albeit in the name of ECOSOC.
296
 Unfortunately, a lot of states 
have failed to submit their reports.
297
 Except for the few states the reports submitted by 
the majority of states are not up to standard and therefore not informative of the 
economic, social and cultural rights prevailing in the states concerned.
298
 At its third 
                                                 
293
 See, Philip Alston, The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, in THE UNITED NATIONS 
AND HUMAN RIGHTS: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL, supra note 172, at 473, 473. At 488-489, “The Committee 
was established pursuant to ESC Res. 1985/17.” Although, it was expected to emulate the Human Rights 
Committee, it was not treaty based and it existed at the pleasure of ECOSOC but in practice the Committee 
acted independently of the Council except for the Rules of Procedure.  
294
 Philip Alston, The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, in THE UNITED NATIONS AND 
HUMAN RIGHTS: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL, supra note 172, at 473, 491.  
295
 Philip Alston, The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, in THE UNITED NATIONS AND 
HUMAN RIGHTS: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL, supra note 172, at 473, 487. 
296
 See, Philip Alston, The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, in THE UNITED NATIONS 
AND HUMAN RIGHTS: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL, supra note 172, at 473, 491. See, also Louis Henkin, 
Introduction, in THE INTERNATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS, The Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra 
note 92, at 1, 16. “Compliance with the Covenant is not the charge of a special monitoring body but of 
political bodies, the Economic and Social Council and the General Assembly.” See also, Lillich, supra note 
7, 583. “Each of the core UN human rights treaties, except the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights, creates a specific monitoring body, usually a committee of independent experts numbering between 
10 (CAT) and 23 (CEDAW).”    
297
 See, LORI F. DAMROSCH et al, INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS, supra note 21, at 633. 
“Like other U.N. human rights treaty bodies, the Committee on Economic Social and Cultural Rights has 
faced the problem of persistent failure by states parties to satisfy their reporting obligations.”  
298
 Philip Alston, The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, in THE UNITED NATIONS AND 
HUMAN RIGHTS: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL, supra note 172, at 473, 491. The reason given for these poor 
reports is that these states consider the reports to be a “diplomatic chore. Accordingly, the accepted 
 65 
session the Committee insisted that state parties should not take the reporting requirement 
as “a procedural matter designed solely to satisfy each State Party’s formal obligation to 
report.”299 The report must disclose an accurate state assessment of the rights contained in 
ICESCR. 
Initially, it could take a state party a possible nine year period to complete a 
comprehensive report, but the Committee later introduced a single reporting system and 
reduced the reporting period to one year.
300
  In an attempt to encourage state parties to 
comply with the reporting requirement the Committee resolved that it will schedule 
reports and notify the defaulting states parties. If the concerned states fail to submit the 
scheduled report after the notification the Committee will go ahead and make its 
assessment without the report from the state.
301
 This position encouraged some defaulting 
state parties to comply with the Covenant.
302
 The Committee has proposed an Optional 
Protocol, similar to the ICCPR Optional Protocol. The Optional Protocol will allow 
individuals to file complaints with the Committee.
303
  
                                                                                                                                                 
‘wisdom’ has been that it should be carried out with the least possible expenditure…with little involvement 
on the part of those in government who are actually concerned with the rights in question, and with no 
involvement at all of the broader range of social partners in the community.” 
299
 Philip Alston, The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, in THE UNITED NATIONS AND 
HUMAN RIGHTS: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL, supra note 172, at 473, 492. 
300
 See, Philip Alston, The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, in THE UNITED NATIONS 
AND HUMAN RIGHTS: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL, supra note 172, at 473, 504. The rights were divided into 
three categories and each category was reported in a three year interval.  
301
 See, Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Report on the Sixteenth and Seventeenth 
Sessions (28 April-16 May 1997, 17 November- 8December 1997) U.N. Doc. E/1998/22, p. 19-20 para. 44.  
302
 See, Scott Leckie, The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Catalyst for Change in a 
System Needing Reform, in THE FUTURE OF UN HUMAN RIGHTS TREATY MONITORING, supra note 226, at 
129, 130. “[T]he Committee can provide an impetus for the fuller realisation of domestic human rights 
objectives.”   
303
 The United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights urged the Commission for Human Rights to 
give high consideration priority to the protocol. See, Sub-Commission on Human Rights resolution 2001/6. 
See also Lillich, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS, PROBLEMS OF LAW, POLICY AND PRACTICE supra note 3, 
at 584. 
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Despite the fact that states are the primary parties to these Covenants, the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties (the Vienna Convention) governs these international 
treaties. It
 
is declaratory of customary international law.
304
 Thus, the doctrine of pacta 
sunt servanda which obligates states to observe agreements in good faith also applies to 
the two Covenants.
305
 Every state party to the Covenants and other Human Rights treaties 
surrenders its sovereignty to the terms of the treaty it enters.
306
 No reservations that are 
“incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty”307 are permissible. Therefore, all 
the member states to the two Covenants are legally obligated to observe civil, political, 
economic, social and cultural rights in good faith. 
The Commission on Human Rights/Human Rights Council   
The creation of the Commission on Human Rights (the Commission)
308
 within the 
United Nations mechanism is further evidence of the critical role that Human Rights are 
supposed to play. The Commission, under the auspices of Economic and Social Council 
(ECOSOC) monitored Human Rights standards in every state.
309
 The General Assembly 
                                                 
304
 LORI F. DAMROSCH et al, INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS, supra note 21, at 453. 
305
 Article 26 of the Vienna Convention reads, “Every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and 
must be performed by them in good faith.” See also, The Nuclear Tests Case: Australia and New Zealand v. 
France 1974 I.C.J 253, 457. The International Court of Justice held that pacta sunt servanda in the law of 
treaties is based on good faith.  
306
 See also, Vratislav Pechota, The Development of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, in THE 
INTERNATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 92, at 31, 35 “By virtue of the principle pacta sunt servanda, 
parties to a treaty not only give up the right of nonperformance but also acquire the right to call any other 
party to account if they have grounds to believe that the provisions of the covenant are not being fully and 
effectively implemented. The exercise of this right cannot be regarded as an illegitimate intervention or an 
inimical act on the part of the complaining state party, nor can the concern so manifested be lightly 
dismissed. That some states have shown reluctance to exercise the right does not mean that states have 
generally looked upon the principle of mutual scrutiny as ineffectual.”   
307
 Article 19 (c) Vienna Convention on Law of Treaties.  
308
 U.N Charter art. 68 reads, “The Economic and Social Council shall set up commissions in economic and 
social fields and for the promotion of human rights, and such other commissions as may be required for the 
performance of its functions.” The commission had its working groups and special rapporteurs which did 
the field work studying or investigating human rights violations.  
309
 See, A MORE SECURE WORLD: Our Shared Responsibility. Report of the High –level Panel on Threats, 
Challenges and Change, supra note 119, at 89. “The Commission on Human Rights is entrusted with 
promoting respect for human rights globally, fostering international cooperation in human rights, 
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replaced the Commission with the Human Rights Council (the Council) in 2006.
310
 The 
Council assumed the duties of the Commission and it is expected to improve on the 
Commission’s work.311   
In 1967 and 1970 ECOSOC passed resolutions 1235(XLII)
312
 and 
1503(XLVIII)
313
 respectively. The two procedures established the Commission’s power 
to study or investigate violations of Human Rights by states.
314
 The Commission “played 
a consistently important role in standard-setting.”315 The 1235 procedure was held in 
public and the 1503 procedure was conducted in private.  
                                                                                                                                                 
responding to violations in specific countries and assisting countries in building their human rights 
capacity.” 
310
 See General Assembly resolution A/RES/60/251. Unlike the Commission which was a subsidiary of 
ECOSOC the Council is a standing body which is directly under the Geneal Assembly. Resolution 
A/60/L48 created the Council to redress the shortcomings of the Commission. One of the ways in which 
these shortcomings were redressed is the Council’s periodic review of each state’s implementation of 
Human Rights objectives.   .         
311
 See paragraph 6 of the A/RES/60/251. It reads, The General Assembly “Decides also that the Council 
shall assume, review and, where necessary, improve and rationalize all mandates, mechanisms, functions 
and responsibilities of the Commission on Human Rights in order to maintain a system of special 
procedures, expert advice and a complaint procedure; the Council shall complete this review within one 
year after the holding of its first session;” Resolution A/60/L48 created the Council to redress the 
shortcomings of the Commission. One of the ways in which these shortcomings were redressed is the 
Council’s periodic review of each state’s implementation of Human Rights objectives.          
312
 See  42 U.N. Doc. E/4393 (1967). It authorizes the Commission to study reports of Human Rights 
violations in trust and non-self governing territories where there ware allegations of systematic human 
rights abuses. 
313
 It created and authorized the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of 
Minorities to investigate or study systematic human rights abuses. This extended the investigations self 
governing territories.  
314
 Although the present discussion concentrates on the Commission it should be noted that it is not the only 
source of Human Rights data. Outside the bodies and procedures that are created by Human Rights treaties 
the General Assembly may get reports from Trusteeship Council, Special Committee on Decolonization, 
Commission on Status of Women, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization 
(UNESCO), International Labor Organization (ILO) etc. See also, Lillich supra, note 3, at 562-563.   
315
 See, Philip Alston, The Commission on Human Rights, in Philip Alston, The Commission on Human 
Rights, in THE UNITED NATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL, supra note 172, at 126, 126-
136. “[T]he Commission on Human Rights has undergone a profound transformation in terms of its role 
and functions within the international community. In the process, it has firmly established itself as the 
single most important United Nations organ in human rights field despite its subordinate status as one of 
several specialized (‘functional’) commissions answerable to the Economic and Social Council and, 
through it, to the General Assembly.” The Commission drafted the International Bill of Rights and in 1948 
the UN unanimously adopted the Universal Declaration as part of the International Bill of Rights. It 
finished drafting the other part i.e. the two Covenants (ICCPR and the ICESCPR) in 1954 which was 
adopted later in 1966.  It also influenced the establishment of thematic procedures e.g. Working Group on 
 68 
Resolution 1503 gave the Commission the power to “look into situations insofar 
as it is able to look anywhere, in all countries, not only those party to a particular treaty. 
Therefore, it is in many ways the procedural core of the global human rights regime.”316 
Phillip Alston characterized the 1503 procedure as a “petition-information’ system 
because its objective is to use complaints as a means by which to assist the Commission 
in identifying”317 Human Rights violations. Assessing Human Rights situations in private 
was meant to encourage cooperation between the concerned states and the Commission. 
Unfortunately, the need for cooperation led to “unprobing [and] apologist” reports318 and 
some governments merely ignored the Commission’s requests.319 Despite these apparent 
weaknesses many of the 1235 public Human Rights debates originated from the 1503 
procedure.
 320
 Besides, the 1503 procedure allowed the working group “to consider all 
communications…which appear to reveal a consistent pattern of gross and reliably 
                                                                                                                                                 
Enforced and Involuntary Disappearances, Special Rapporteur on Summary or Arbitrary Executions, 
Special Rapporteur on Torture, Special Rapporteur on Religious Intolerance etc. id. at 173-175.    
316
 JACK DONNELLY supra note 79, at 208. 
317
 Philip Alston, The Commission on Human Rights, in THE UNITED NATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS: A 
CRITICAL APPRAISAL, supra note 172, at 126, 146. 
318
 Philip Alston, The Commission on Human Rights, in THE UNITED NATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS: A 
CRITICAL APPRAISAL, supra note 172, at 126, 150. 
319
 For example Equatorial Guinea ignored the Commission’s inquiry about Human Rights abuses under 
1503 procedure. See Philip Alston, The Commission on Human Rights, in THE UNITED NATIONS AND 
HUMAN RIGHTS: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL, supra note 172, at 126, 159. “The situation in that country was 
chronic and attempts to deal with it since 1977 under the 1503 procedure had simply been ignored by the 
government. The case was transferred to the public procedure thereby making it the first country to be 
‘graduated’ from 1503 in this way…” 
320
 Philip Alston, The Commission on Human Rights, in THE UNITED NATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS: A 
CRITICAL APPRAISAL, supra note 172, at 126, 147. “[M]any of the situations dealt with under the 
Commission’s public procedures [were] raised in the 1503 context.” See also id. at 151 "There is no bar to 
focusing on the same country in both procedures at the same time.” 
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attested violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms.”321 [Emphasis added.] 
Thus working groups also considered communications from individuals.
322
  
Resolution 1235 was initially and primarily meant to target Human Rights 
violations in occupied states.
323
 As a result, the Commission ignored violations of Human 
Rights in non-foreign occupied states.
324
  The turning point was in 1973 when the 
Commission investigated Human Rights violations in Chile, thereby setting a 
precedent
325
 for the Commission to investigate situations involving “neither colonialism 
nor racism.”326 Since then “[a]n enormous range of situations has been specifically 
                                                 
321
 See ECOSOC resolution 1503 (XLVIII) of 27 May 1970. Even one was to agree with Philip Aston that 
the “individual is but a piece of evidence” (See also, Philip Alston, The Commission on Human Rights, in 
THE UNITED NATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL, supra note 172, at 126, 146. 
Individuals play an evidentiary role.) 
322
 See Robertson A.H., Implementation System: International Measures, in THE INTERNATIONAL BILL OF 
RIGHTS, The Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 92, at 332, 358. “Resolution 
1503…confirms a clear if timid recognition that the United Nations and the international human rights 
system cannot totally ignore individual complaints of violation of human rights.” See also, Philip Alston, 
The Commission on Human Rights, in THE UNITED NATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL, 
supra note 172, at 126, 151. “[D]espite the focus on ‘situations’ some individuals have been directly 
assisted under the [1503] procedure.” 
323
 See Philip Alston, The Commission on Human Rights, in THE UNITED NATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS: A 
CRITICAL APPRAISAL, supra note 172, at 126, 156.Initially the resolution was meant to target racism and 
apartheid in Southern Africa and occupied states but a compromise between the Eastern and the Western 
blocks led to a broader application of the procedure to include any Human Rights violation. 
324
 See, Philip Alston, The Commission on Human Rights, in THE UNITED NATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS: 
A CRITICAL APPRAISAL, supra note 172, at 126, 159. For example the Commission did not respond to the 
1971 mass killings in East Pakistan (now Bangladesh); the 1972 mass expulsion of Asians and killings in 
Uganda by Idi Amin; killings in Cambodia during Pol Pot’s reign of terror (1976-1979); Jean-Bedel 
Bokassa’s repression in Central Africa Republic from 1976 to 1979 and disappearances in Argentina and 
Uruguay. See also, id. at 130. The Commission’s “failure to take any action on communications and the 
ineffectiveness of its so-called ‘promotional’ activities are more readily understood in the light of the 
Commission’s own perception that it could, and even should, be a technical rather than a political body.” 
325
 In 1974 the General Assembly passed Resolution 3219 (XXIX) which endorsed that the Commission 
should study the Human Rights violations in Chile. In 1978 the Commission asked the governments of 
Kampuchea (Cambodia) and Nicaragua to respond to allegations of Human Rights violations and in 1979 
Equatorial Guinea was the subject of the Commission’s investigation. Since 1980 other countries that have 
been investigated by the Commission include Bolivia, El Salvador, Haiti, Liberia, Cuba, Somalia, Burundi, 
Sudan etc.   
326
 Philip Alston, The Commission on Human Rights, in THE UNITED NATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS: A 
CRITICAL APPRAISAL, supra note 172, at 126, 158. “In principle at least , the door had finally been opened, 
albeit only a fraction, to permit the effective use of 1235 in virtually any situation, provided only that the 
political will could be mustered…It is important to note at this point that each …precedent-setting 
investigations…had been authorized on the ‘understanding’ that it would not in fact create a precedent…By 
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discussed under the 1235 item, and in some cases, the mere expression of serious concern 
or the threat of a resolution has been sufficient to provoke a constructive response from 
the government concerned.”327  
The Commission used to meet once a year to discuss these reports (later amended 
to a meeting in between sessions). Since Human Rights issues require urgent redress 
meeting once or twice a year adversely affected the Commissions effectiveness to deal 
with issues that require urgent redress. Despite this flaw the “glass [was] at best half 
full.”328 The General Assembly and the Commission complemented each other.329 The 
Commission provided “a forum in which various activities can be undertaken and it is 
itself an actor playing the roles of a catalyst, a manager, a generator of norms, and a 
protector of rights.”330 Besides, the Commission laid the foundation for the Human 
Rights Council. The jury is still out to rule on the effectiveness of the Council since it is 
still in its formative stage. 
                                                                                                                                                 
the time Chile was added to the list the assumption that no precedent was being set was not an especially 
credible one, despite the protestations of those who sponsored the proposal.”  
327
 Philip Alston, The Commission on Human Rights, in THE UNITED NATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS: A 
CRITICAL APPRAISAL, supra note 172, at 126, 161. Even though governmental cooperation is still sought 
under this procedure the fact that it is public has led to great majority of governments seeking “to defend 
themselves systematically and vigorously within the Commission. Thus detailed rebuttals of country-
specific reports are now very much the norm rather than the exception.” Id., at 171.  
328
Philip Alston, The Commission on Human Rights, in THE UNITED NATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS: A 
CRITICAL APPRAISAL, supra note 172, at126, 173.  
329
 See, Philip Alston, The Commission on Human Rights, in THE UNITED NATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS: 
A CRITICAL APPRAISAL, supra note 172, at 126, 164. 
330
 Philip Alston, The Commission on Human Rights, in THE UNITED NATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS: A 
CRITICAL APPRAISAL, supra note 172, at 126, 204.  
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Chapter 4 
Conclusion 
The observance and promotion of Universal Human Rights is critical for peaceful 
and secure co-existence of mankind. Interdependence and international trade among 
states have shrunk the world to a global village. What may have been considered as a 
purely ‘internal state affair’ sixty years ago, in this case Human Rights, is after all not 
exclusively internal.
331
  
Since 1945 there has been a steady and irreversible growth of a Human Rights 
movement. The movement stretches from the United Nations and Universal Declaration 
to the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials
332
 and from the Covenants and Conventions to the 
regional Human Rights treaties and non-governmental organizations.
333
 Although, there 
is a gap between the Human Rights rhetoric and enforcing them an optimistic assessment 
of the growth and realization of Universal Human Rights is irresistible.
334
  Since WWII 
                                                 
331
 See, Louis Henkin, THE AGE OF RIGHTS, supra note 6, at 27. “The impression that issue of human rights 
is essentially domestic, not international is patently mistaken. That which is the subject of international law 
is ipso facto not domestic.”  
332
 Perhaps the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials are the most celebrated instances of Human Rights intervention 
by the international community. Unfortunately, a permanent International Criminal Court of the same 
magnitude as the Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals was not established until 2002.  
333
 See, Louis Henkin, THE AGE OF RIGHTS, supra note 6, at29. “No one is prepared to say that human 
rights would be better without the forces for compliance generated by the human rights movement.” See 
also, Shale Horowitz and Albrecht Schnabel, Human rights and societies in transition: International context 
and sources of variation, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND SOCIETIES IN TRANSISION, supra note 1, at 1, 5 “Human 
rights NGOs and their individual and organizational supporters are the final component of the international 
human rights regime… Although they have their own ideological biases, competition among them [NGOs] 
produces a large and relatively objective stream of information about human rights practices around the 
world.” See also, Robert G. Patman, International Human Rights after the Cold War in UNIVERSAL HUMAN 
RIGHTS?, supra note 5, at 1, 12 He gives the examples of NGO like Amnesty International and Human 
Rights Watch as authoritative and invaluable dispensers of Human Rights information.  
334
 See, Louis Henkin, THE RIGHTS OF MAN TODAY, supra note 25, at 133-134. “The vindication or the 
rights of man began 200 years ago, in some matters, to some extent, for some people. Today, human rights 
are alive, if not wholly everywhere, but for most people, perhaps everywhere, human rights are much better 
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“human rights have… been deeply implicated in the realities of international politics.”335  
Granted, not all states observe Human Rights but even Human Rights abusive states have 
Constitutions which recognize and promote Human Rights.
336
 Like any other historical 
movement the universal enforcement and observance of Human Rights will withstand the 
test of time.
337
 
Human Rights are guard rails against the excesses of the state. No state is immune 
to Human Rights scrutiny. The primacy of Human Rights is as old as the existence of 
organized society. States are obliged to follow their dictates. Cultural relativism is 
perpetual but it is not a passport to Human Rights violations. No culture is imperiled by 
the fundamentals of Human Rights.  The argument that cultural relativism negates the 
universality of Human Rights is shallow because the essence, significance and/or 
relevance of Human Rights are common among different cultures.
338
 Despite the 
multiplicity of different cultures, all cultures do not deny people their right to life, right to 
liberty, right to justice and equity or right to mutual respect, caring and integrity. There 
are ethnic and cultural differences in almost every culture. Besides, no culture can claim 
cultural purity. Foreign influence has permeated in almost every culture. 
                                                                                                                                                 
than they were 200 years ago.” See also, Louis Henkin, THE AGE OF RIGHTS, supra note 6, at 29. “The 
international human rights movement has established the idea of human rights, and that idea in not likely to 
be superseded. In modern, industrial urbanized societies that idea and forms into which it has been poured 
remain essential for human dignity.”  
335
  Louis Henkin, THE AGE OF RIGHTS, supra note 6, at 27.   
336
 See, Louis Henkin, THE AGE OF RIGHTS, supra note 6, at 26. “Human rights are in the constitution of 
virtually every state. All states have recognized the idea of human rights and have accepted their 
articulation in the Universal Declaration; most states are parties to some of the principal international 
instruments, and at least half of the world’s states…are parties to the principal, comprehensive covenants.” 
337
 LAUREN, supra note 75, at 39. “All the major breakthrough in the long struggle for international human 
rights…emerged in the wake of upheaval, wars, and revolutions.” 
338
 Vivit Muntarbhorn, Asia and Human Rights at the Crossroads of New Millennium: Between the 
Universalist and the Particularist? in U NIVERSAL H UMAN RIGHTS ?, supra note 5, at 81, 84. “Universal 
human rights are rooted in many cultures.” 
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The universality of Human Rights is challenged by governments that violate and 
oppress their own citizens. They hypocritically argue against any involvement by the 
international community in the ‘internal affairs’ of their sovereign states and question the 
West’s moral position to champion Human Rights given the West’s history of Human 
Rights abuse. At the UN Vienna Conference on Human Rights, Warren Christopher’s 
admonished the international community to “respect the religious, social and cultural 
characteristics that make each country unique. But we cannot let cultural relativism 
become the last refuge of repression”339 [Emphasis added] Unfortunately, “[r]eality 
shows that the international community is deeply rooted in a culture of reaction, not 
proaction, and that it reacts only if the interests of some major powers are significantly 
threatened.”340 Consequently, Human Rights violations are not pursued with the vigor 
and urgency that they deserve.  
All former foreign dominated or colonized states, be they Asian, African, 
European or Latin American gained their independence by appealing to the international 
community to support and enforce the observance of their Universal Human Rights. 
Unfortunately, poor governance and politically motivated dismissal of the universality of 
Human Rights by former colonized leaders negatively impacts the symbiotic relation 
between Universal Human Rights and cultural relativism. It is sad that hypocrisy and 
political expediency triumph over Human Rights.  
Universal Human Rights are not a western imperialist agenda. Human Rights are 
an international concern and they are within the jurisdiction of the international 
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 MAHONEY, supra note 7, at 170. Warren Christopher was a former US Secretary of State.    
340
 Albrecht Schnabel, International Efforts to Protect Human Rights in Transition Societies: Right, Duty, 
or Politics, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND SOCIETIES IN TRANSISION, CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES, RESPONSES  supra 
note 1, at 141, 155-156. 
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community. The West may be more vocal about the observance and promotion of Human 
Rights but it also had its fair share of violating Universal Human Rights. The fact that at 
one point or the other all nations abused or were victims of Human Rights abuse means 
that the recognition and observance of Human Rights is a universal challenge rather than 
a form of cultural imperialism.
341
 When the United Nations was founded Belgium and 
Mexico expressed concern over the tyrannical potential of the Security Council if it was 
given power to deal with the internal matters of United Nations member states.
342
 While 
this fear may have been reasonable and perhaps warranted at that time, 
343
 history has 
shown that it is actually the United Nations lack of urgent concerted and decisive action 
on Human Rights issues that sets dangerous precedents and threatens international peace 
and security today and not the Security Council’s tyranny.344   
Unless we subscribe to the an Indian system (varnashramadharma), which states 
that there are “fundamental and unchangeable differences in the nature of human beings 
that prevent any uniform or universal standard from being even considered, let alone 
applied”345 we cannot deny the universality of Human Rights. Ironically, the founding 
father of independent India, Mahatma Gandhi, decried violations of Human Rights in 
South Africa and India. Human Rights violation should be the yardstick to justify 
                                                 
341
 See MAHONEY, supra  note 7, at 111.  “A final approach, then, to the charge of Western imposition of 
human rights on other cultures is to accept the differences between various cultures and traditions as the 
product of history, and to view human rights not as an imposition but as a challenge…to every culture.” 
342
 Mohammed Bedjaoui, On the Efficacy of International Organization: Some Variations on an 
Inexhaustible Theme, in TOWARD MORE EFFECTIVE SUPERVISION BY INTERNATIONAL OGANIZATION, 
ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF G. SCHEMERS, supra note 73, at 7, 17. 
343
 Following the failure of the League of Nations the UN had just been created and was still in its infancy. 
There was lack of trust among the international players. The USA, UK, Russia, China and perhaps France 
where the most influential UN powers. They could easily sway the way the Security Council operated. 
344
 For example, Nazi genocides were encouraged by the international community’s failure to act when the 
Armenians were massacred by the Turks in WWI. Inaction or delayed action by the United Nations in 
Rwanda, Yugoslavia, Sudan, Congo (formerly Zaire) etc. threatened whole regions.  
345
 LAUREN, supra note 75, 23.  
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intervention by the international community.
346
 Granted, every Human Rights crisis is 
unique and has its own peculiarities but common among them is the suffering of innocent 
citizens.
347
  
Rein Mullerson supports the notion that violation of Human Rights is a threat to 
international peace and security and even implies that the United Nations Security 
Council is of the same mindset
 
.
348
  
“Customary law is the ‘oldest and the original source of international law’ and it 
is the source of the law of humanitarian intervention.” Pg 117 John J. Merriam 
                                                 
346
 MAHONEY, supra  note 7, at 171. “Part of the function of human rights…as expressing a globally 
effective ethic is to act as a continuing critique not only on individuals but also on whole societies and 
cultures, North and South, East and West”. 
347
 For example, the Security Council had to justify its intervention in Haiti and Somalia because Security 
Council considered each of these crises to be ‘unique’ but the Human Rights abuses perpetrated by Louis 
Jodel Chamblain in Haiti and Mohamed Farah Aydid in Somali had the same adverse effect on the 
suffering victims of Human Rights violations.    
348
 See Rein Mullerson, Fifty Years of the United Nations: Peace and Human Rights in the UN Agenda in 
HUMAN RIGHTS FOR THE 21
st
 CENTURY, supra note 76, at 143, 154. “The UN Security Council has started 
to use the concept of a ‘threat to international peace and security’ while dealing with grave human rights 
violations…Some of these humanitarian emergencies may really have had serious security implications 
(e.g. the situation in former Yugoslavia), while others have hardly had any, especially in the traditional 
military sense (e.g. the situation in Haiti” 
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